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Abstract
We test the hypothesis that interconnections across financial institutions can be
explained by a diversification motive. This idea stems from the empirical evidence of
the existence of long-term exposures that cannot be explained by a liquidity motive
(maturity or currency mismatch). We model endogenous interconnections of het-
erogenous financial institutions facing regulatory constraints using a maximization
of their expected utility. Both theoretical and simulation-based results are com-
pared to a stylized genuine financial network. The diversification motive appears to
plausibly explain interconnections among key players. Using our model, the impact
of regulation on interconnections between banks -currently discussed at the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision- is analyzed.
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1 Introduction
The behavior of financial institutions, namely banks and insurance companies, constitutes
a paradox. On the one hand, they oppose one another in a competition to collect deposits
as one may expect for firms in a common sector. In this perspective, the distress of
one institution seems good news for the others since there is room for increasing market
shares. However, on the other hand, financial institutions need to cooperate. For instance,
the withdrawal of a bank from the short term interbank market means that a source
of liquidity vanishes, triggering setbacks for other banks. In this case, one financial
institution’s distress is definitely bad news for the other ones. Thus, even if they are
in competition, banks cooperate, insurance companies cooperate and last but not least,
banks cooperate with insurance companies. The last point has been ever more significant
during the recent years. A support of this cooperation is the interconnections they develop
between each other.
In a short-term view, interconnections mirror the resolution of the liquidity needs. As
any other firms, banks and insurance companies face asynchronous in-flows and out-flows
of cash. One solution is that every institution has its own cash buffer. Alternatively,
institutions can create a liquidity pool by sharing their cash to mutualize the liquidity
risk (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1996; Tirole, 2010; Rochet, 2004). Allen and Gale (2000)
explicitly link the interconnectedness of banks to liquidity shocks. Besides the asynchro-
nism of in-flows and out-flows, the liquidity risk is particularly salient since banks are
exposed to runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and operate large gross transactions in
payment systems (Rochet and Tirole, 1996). Indeed flows between institutions are not
netted.
However, one may argue that this analysis is not specific to banks and insurance
companies since every firm actually faces asynchronous in-flows and out-flows. Liquid-
ity concerns are not the only cause of interconnections between financial institutions.
Moreover, there is evidence in the literature that banks are interconnected not only in
the short term but also in the long run. For instance, according to Upper and Worms
(2004), half of German interbank lending is composed of loans whose maturity is over 4
years (see Figure 1). According to Table 1 in Alves et al. (2013), interbank assets with
residual maturity larger than one year account for about 50% of total interbank assets
at the European level.1 These long term exposures cannot be explained by a liquidity
motive since liquidity is a short term phenomenon. Other possible reasons are horizontal
integration (share of a pool of customers via joint products), vertical integration (e.g.
risk transfer between insurance and reinsurance companies), ego of top managers aiming
at increasing their control of the market and last but not least diversification. Of course,
in practice, the network formation stems from a combination of all these motives. How-
ever, for reasons explained further, diversification appears as a very important motive.
Therefore, in this paper, we consider that these long-term exposures are accounted for
by a diversification principle, in a sense that will be defined in the following.
The diversification principle is supported by the existence of various business models
for banks and insurance companies. The diversity of institutions leads to a diversity of
debts and shares available for the other institutions as assets. In the case of insurance
companies, there is a clear-cut distinction between mutual funds and profit-oriented in-
1The existence of long-term interconnections, through loans or shares, is also reported for other
countries such as Canada (see Table 3 in Gauthier et al. (2012)) or France (Fourel et al., 2013).
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Figure 1: Extract of Table 1 in Upper and Worms (2004).
surance companies. The banking sector regroups heterogenous institutions from mutual
saving banks to commercial banks. Moreover, the bankassurance business model blurs
the separation between banking and insurance activities. This variety can be explained
by the different preferences of stakeholders or by historical patterns. Investors who have
the same risk aversion gather and form an institution. This heterogeneity can also be
linked to a specialization process. For instance, a mutual savings bank funded by farmers
is very efficient in granting loans to farmers who in turn favor this bank since it provides
the fairest interest rate. This auto-selection mechanism leads to a situation close to a
local monopoly. We then understand that for a specific bank, getting interconnected to
other institutions is a way to get access to their specific markets. Considering specific
markets implicitly assumes that these are not perfectly correlated: for example retail dif-
fers from trading. Similarly, insurance companies also specialize in specific risk classes.2
Thus being interconnected to other insurance companies allows diversifying one’s risk
portfolio. All this supports the fact that the diversification principle may explain long-
term interconnections among banks and insurance companies.
In order to properly model banking and insurance activities, one has to keep in mind
that the banking and insurance sectors are characterized by a very specific production
process as well as a heavy regulation. The core activity of a bank consists of the selec-
tion of profitable loans and in the management of the resulting maturity transformation.
Banks screen potential entrepreneurs for reliable projects and fairly price the resulting
interest rate charged. At the same time, they manage the maturity gap: loans to en-
trepreneurs are long-term assets whereas deposits and issued bonds constitute short-term
debt on the liability side. Information is also key to the core activity of insurance (e.g.
damage insurance): the insurer has to efficiently assess the riskiness of the potential
policyholder and to deduce the corresponding premium. Strictly speaking the insurance
company does not provide maturity transformation. However, its production cycle is
reversed: it first collects premia and cushions losses when claims occur. The regulation
of the banking and insurance sectors is crucial to maintain people’s confidence in the sys-
tem. In order to avoid bank runs, it is necessary that depositors consider their deposit as
safe. Likewise, if policy-holders are not confident in the capacity of the insurer to honor
its commitments, they will make other insurance choices. A solvency ratio is imposed to
banks and insurance companies: in the case of banks, the ratio compares the riskiness
2For instance, in the US health insurance sector, specialized institutions exist. The Federal Employees
Health Benefits (FEHB) Program is dedicated to federal employees.
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of granted loans with own funds, while for insurance companies, the ratio balances the
riskiness of insured risks and the collected premia.
Our paper has two main objectives. The first objective is to test whether a diversification
motive is a plausible cause for interconnectedness across financial institutions. To do so,
we build a model where interconnections are endogenous choices of financial institutions
resulting from the maximization of their expected utility. After deriving some theoretical
and simulation-based features of the resulting network, we compare these features to those
of a stylized financial network (benchmark) based on empirical evidence. The second ob-
jective is to fairly assess the impact of regulation on interconnections based on our model.
The cornerstone of this paper is the modeling of the endogenous balance sheet of a
financial institution, especially interconnections. Endogenous networks have been inten-
sively analyzed in sociology or socio-economics (for a survey, see Goyal (2012) or Jackson
and Zenou (2013)). However, finance yields a new field of application. Usually, intercon-
nections among financial institutions are considered as given, especially in applied papers
(see among others Cifuentes et al. (2005), Arinaminpathy et al. (2012), or Anand et al.
(2013)). Endogenous financial networks stem from the seminal paper by Allen and Gale
(2000). For instance, Babus (2007) models interconnections across banks as the result
of an insurance motive: interconnections represent a means of protection against conta-
gion. More recently, Acemoglu et al. (2013) focus on the short-term interbank market
and model the network formation in the case of risk-neutral banks being able to renego-
tiate their claims in a case of distress. Elliott et al. (2014) make a case of showing the
incentives that may drive financial network formations. Important insights are brought
by this strand of literature inspired by microeconomics and game theory analysis.3 Nev-
ertheless, in this field, financial institutions only compute their interconnections: the
remaining elements of their balance sheet are completely exogenous. This assumption
seems suitable in a short-term perspective but not anymore when considering long-term
interconnections. Therefore, by including more endogenous balance sheet items than the
sole interconnections, we distance ourselves from this strand of research. To the best of
our knowledge, the unique paper that considers a complete balance sheet optimization
(apart from the debt) is Bluhm et al. (2013). They propose a dynamic network formation
with risk-neutral banks. Using a specific "trial and error" process, the authors first com-
pute the volume of interbank assets (that corresponds to the network’s importance) and
second its allocation (that corresponds to the network’s shape). The allocation is carried
out using a matching algorithm based on the strict indifference of banks. In contrast, our
paper considers heterogeneously risk-averse banks which explicitly get interconnected to
specific counterparts. Last but not least, almost all papers only consider lending (or debt
securities) whereas, based on Gouriéroux et al. (2012), our paper also considers shares.
This feature cannot be neglected in a long run perspective since financial institutions can
take cross-shareholdings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 falls into two parts. First, the production
process of banks and insurance companies and the regulatory constraints are described.
Secondly, we introduce the financial network benchmark. Section 3 presents the theo-
retical results. After describing the optimization program of financial institutions, we
show the existence of an equilibrium and discuss the conditions for its uniqueness. We
show that interconnections are usually optimal for financial institutions. These theoret-
3See among others Cohen-Cole et al. (2011), Gofman (2012), Farboodi (2014) or Georg (2014).
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ical properties allow to characterize the shape of the network stemming from a diver-
sification motive. Therefore, we compare the shape of a genuine interbank network to
a diversification-based one. In Section 4, we first present the computational method-
ology and the calibration choices. Then we show some simulation results which lead
us to assess the proximity of the obtained network to the benchmark network both in
terms of balance sheet volume and support of interconnections (debt securities or cross-
shareholdings). Section 5 provides an analysis of financial interconnections with respect
to financial regulation. Elaborating on Repullo and Suarez (2013), we first show how
to fairly analyze interconnectedness and then compare different regulatory frameworks.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 Balance sheet structure and network benchmark
In this section, we first describe the economic setup which corresponds to the technology
of financial institutions. We introduce the different elements of their balance sheet as
well as the regulatory constraints. We then present the stylized network to be later used
as a benchmark.
2.1 Bank and insurance business
Each bank has access to a specific class of external illiquid assets and each insurance
company specializes in one specific class of risk. These classes can be interpreted as
main banking (respectively insurance) activities such as, for instance, trading, commer-
cial loans, mortgage loans, sovereign loans (respectively e.g. property insurance, liability
insurance, life insurance).
The tight relationship between a specific class of assets (respectively risks) and a specific
institution has to be interpreted as a consequence of costly portfolio management by
investors followed by a specialization process. By portfolio management, we mean the
screening process. For banks, that means selecting promising entrepreneurs to finance
and offering a fair interest rate. In the case of insurance companies, it means organizing
the mutualization of risks, i.e. finding the adequate premium with respect to the poli-
cyholder’s risk profile. The specialization process strengthens the efficiency of managing
a specific portfolio. Due to auto-selection of customers, specialization triggers further
specialization.
2.1.1 Asset side
Bank i’s specific asset book value is labeled Axi, for i = 1, . . . , n (we consider n finan-
cial institutions). This asset is some illiquid loan and therefore cannot be exchanged
on a market. Thus, no market value can be defined and only its book value is con-
sidered in the following. We denote Ri and ri the net return of Axi and its realiza-
tion, respectively. The distribution function of the returns R1, . . . , Rn is denoted FR:
FR(r1, . . . , rn) = P(R1 ≤ r1, . . . , Rn ≤ rn). The corresponding density is denoted by fR.
Banks have access to another external asset, denoted by A`i. Its return, deterministic and
assumed to be common to all institutions, is denoted rrf . Here, A`i is a very liquid and
low-risk asset (for instance AAA bonds or S&P 500 shares), the management of which
does not require high technical skills. In the following, A`i will be assimilated to cash,
which does not require any screening. We assume that insurance companies’ external
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assets are only composed of A`i. Insurance companies are indeed assumed not to have
the same capacity of selecting promising innovators as banks, and therefore do not own
any specific asset.
Besides, Institution i can buy shares or debt securities issued by Institution j in propor-
tions pii,j and γi,j, respectively.
2.1.2 Liability side
The liability side is composed of equity (that is brought by investors) and nominal debt,
whose book values are respectively denoted by Ki and L∗i for Institution i. Since equity
and debt securities will be traded on the the secondary market, it is necessary to introduce
their market values, respectively denoted by Ki and Li.
In the case of banks, L∗i includes different types of debts (deposits and bonds of
various maturities) considered as homogeneous in terms of seniority.4 Banks issue debt
along a common yield curve. In other words, bank debt securities are considered risky
(the interest rate curve is above the risk free yield curve) but have a common degree of
risk (the same rating, say). Despite this common feature, Bank i chooses its own degree of
maturity transformation ωi ∈ [0, 1]. Let us denote by TLi the average of maturities of all
types of debts and by TAi the maturity of the assets. Then, ωi is defined as ωi = 1− TLi
TAi
.
For instance deposits can be seen as every day re-funded overnight loans by households
to banks and therefore their maturity is equal to 0, yielding ωi = 1. On the opposite,
a debt whose maturity equals the asset maturity corresponds to ωi = 0. Banks usually
assume that their short-term debt will be rolled over. However, it is not always the case,
especially during crises. If a bank is only funded by deposits (ωi = 1), it may happen that
all depositors suddenly quit, causing a funding liquidity shock. The same can happen in
the case of debt issued with bonds if investors decide not to roll over. In the extreme
opposite case (ωi = 0), there is no possible liquidity shock (but there is no maturity
transformation). Banking activity is precisely profitable due to maturity transformation
since the interest rate corresponding to long term lending (asset side) is larger than the
one corresponding to short term borrowing. In our model, the interest rate charged on
the debt of Bank i is deterministic, depends on ωi and is denoted by rD(ωi).
In the case of insurance companies, the nominal debt L∗i mostly corresponds to tech-
nical provisions relative to the underwritten risks. Therefore, ωi can no longer be inter-
preted as a degree of maturity transformation but as the mean severity of claims. Thus,
we do not have necessarily ωi ∈ [0, 1] anymore. Contrary to banks, the liability side of an
insurer is stochastic. For instance, in line with standard ruin models (see e.g. Asmussen
and Albrecher, 2010), ωi could be the parameter of the Pareto distribution in a claims
model. Of course, the collected premia directly reflect the risk profile of the insurance
contracts.
The balance sheet of Bank i is represented at the initial date and the end date in
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The dates are represented by an upper-scripted index in
parenthesis.
4For various seniority levels, see Gouriéroux et al. (2013).
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Asset Liability
interbank
cross-
shareholdings
↔
{ pii,1K(0)1
...
pii,nK(0)n
L∗i ↔ debt
interbank
lending ↔
{ γi,1L(0)1
...
γi,nL(0)n
K
(0)
i ↔ value of the firm
external assets ↔ Ax(0)i
cash ↔ A`(0)i
Table 1: Balance sheet of Bank i at the initial date t = 0.
Asset Liability
interbank
cross-
shareholdings
↔
{ pii,1K(1)1
...
pii,nK
(1)
n
L
(1)
i ↔ debt
interbank
lending ↔
{ γi,1L(1)1
...
γi,nL
(1)
n
K
(1)
i ↔ value of the firm
external assets ↔ Ax(1)i
cash ↔ A`(1)i
Table 2: Balance sheet of Bank i at the end date t = 1.
It is important to note that the equity and the debt of the other institutions (on the
asset side) must be priced at the market value at t = 0. At time t = 1, the book value
can be considered.
In line with the Value-of-the-Firm model (Merton, 1974), the value of debt Li and
equity Ki at any date are linked through the following equilibrium equations
Ki = max
( n∑
j=1
pii,jKj +
n∑
j=1
γi,jLj + A`i + Axi − L∗i , 0
)
, for i = 1, . . . , n, and (1)
Li = min
( n∑
j=1
pii,jKj +
n∑
j=1
γi,jLj + A`i + Axi, L
∗
i
)
for i = 1, . . . , n, (2)
These 2n equations define a liquidation equilibrium. Equation (1) corresponds to the
simple accounting definition of equity as the net value of assets over debts. Equation
(2) is very similar to (1) and directly follows from Merton’s model: the debt value is the
minimum between the asset value and the nominal debt.
Proposition 2 in Gouriéroux et al. (2012) states that these equations define a suitable
liquidation equilibrium (see Proposition 5 in Appendix B.1). The cornerstone of our
approach will consist in optimizing the balance sheet items of the financial institutions
(apart from the equity which is exogenous). Proposition 5 states that whatever the
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balance sheet composition of each institution (whatever the values of Axi, A`i, piij, γij and
L∗i satisfying Assumptions (A1′), (A2′) and (A3′) in Proposition 5), the network obtained
can theoretically exist (under suitable unique values for Ki and Li, i = 1, . . . , n). In
particular, our optimized network exists and thus the approach we develop in this paper
can be carried out.
Note that although Gouriéroux et al. (2012) do not consider any maturity, Proposition
5 still holds true in the presence of ωi. It is sufficient to replace L∗i by L∗i (1 + rD(ωi)) in
the proof.
2.2 Regulatory constraints
In line with the usual Basel regulation (see e.g. BCBS, 2011, Section I)5, the solvency
constraint for Institution i is written
K
(0)
i ≥ kAi Ax(0)i + kpi
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j + kγ
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j , (3)
where kAi and kpi are regulatory parameters (risk weights) for external assets and inter-
financial shareholdings and debtholdings, satisfying 0 < kAi , kpi, kγ < 1. The parameter
relative to the external assets is specific to each institution whereas those relative to
interfinancial assets are common within a specific sector (banking or insurance business).
This constraint means that the equity must be higher than the risk-weighted assets and
aims at ensuring the existence of a sufficient capital buffer to avoid losses for creditors in
most cases.
Note that in the case of insurance companies, (3) corresponds to the Solvency I regula-
tory framework (see CEC, 1979)6, apart from the term corresponding to interconnections.
Since Solvency II is not implemented so far, we choose not to consider it in our model-
ing. Moreover, let us emphasize that the weights of banks differ from those of insurance
companies. In the case of an insurer, the constraints on kpi and kγ can be relaxed to
0 ≤ kpii , kγi < 1.
Even if we do not focus on liquidity shocks, we introduce a liquidity constraint:
A`
(0)
i ≥ kL l(ωi, L∗i ), (4)
with l being some increasing function with respect to both variables which will be charac-
terized further and kL satisfying 0 < kL < 1. This constraint aims at ensuring a sufficient
liquid assets buffer to face exposure to liquidity risk (maturity transformation in the case
of banks and claims in the case of insurance companies) stylized by ωi and Li. Note that
this constraint is similar to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (see BCBS, 2013).
2.3 Summary of the optimization framework
In short, both banks and insurance companies select their balance sheet items under
restrictions (class of assets for banks and class of risks for insurance companies) and
regulatory constraints. Their business model is reflected through a size variable and
an intensity variable: the size is the total credit granted for a bank and the total of
5BCBS means Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
6CEC means the Council of the European Communities.
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individual risks covered for an insurance company, while the intensity is the degree of
maturity transformation for a bank and the claims’ severity for an insurance company.
We emphasize that our modeling allows to take the specificities of banks and insurance
companies into account in a unified way. The same parameters allow interpretation in
terms of banks as well as of insurance companies. However, as we mentioned, the nature
of the debt L∗i and that of the maturity ωi are different when considering a bank or an
insurance company. In the following, we will mainly focus on banks.
2.4 Network Benchmark
Our testing principle is to compare the network obtained through our modeling and a
stylized network, so-called benchmark. In this part, we describe this stylized network
along three dimensions. First, we provide the main aggregate items of a bank’s balance
sheet. Thus, we will be able to check if, apart from interbank assets, the obtained balance
sheet composition is close to a real one. Second, we focus on the network shape. This
level provides a qualitative assessment of interconnections. Last, the size of interconnec-
tions along instruments in a typical banking network is described. This last level provides
a quantitative assessment of interconnections. We restrict the analysis to interbank net-
works in industrial countries, typically the United-States, Canada or Europe. We identify
four stylized facts that characterize an interbank network.
2.4.1 Main aggregate items of a bank’s balance sheet
We consider the Bank Holding Company Performance Report Peer Group Data, published
by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, that provides the structure
of asset and liability sides for banks above $10 billion (from 69 banks in 12/2008 to 90 in
12/2012). Figure 2 provides the composition of the asset side and the leverage for these
banks. Corresponding informations are summarized in the following stylized fact:
Stylized fact 1: For a typical bank, the external assets (Axi) represent about 95%
of its total assets while its equity (Ki) represents about 5% of its total assets.
Comment: interbank assets are mostly concentrated in highlighted lines.
Figure 2: Excerpt of the Bank Holding Company Performance Report Peer Group Data
between 12/2008 and 12/2012. Source: www.ffiec.gov.
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2.4.2 Network shape
National interbank networks7 are usually characterized by a core-periphery structure
(Craig and Von Peter, 2014). The core is composed of large banks highly interconnected.
The periphery is composed of smaller banks which are connected to core banks only.
Figure 3 represents a typical national interbank network. Note that at the international
level, the core-periphery structure is much less clear among major banks (Alves et al.,
2013). A complete structure seems more representative of the reality. These observations
are summarized in the following two stylized facts:
Stylized fact 2: For a network composed of banks heterogeneous in size, a core-
periphery structure is ideally expected. In other words, matrices Π = (piij)i,j=1,...,n and
Γ = (γij)i,j=1,...,n present a block structure with a majority of zeros.
Stylized fact 3: For a network composed of large banks homogeneous in size, a com-
plete structure is ideally expected. In other words, Π and Γ have few zero coefficients.
Figure 3: Core-Periphery structure. The core is composed of banks A to C while the
periphery is composed of banks D to H. Source: Figure 1 in Craig and Von Peter (2014).
2.4.3 Interconnections size and support
As mentioned above, total interbank assets account for about 5% of total assets. How-
ever, data concerning the relative importance of the different instruments are scarce. At
the European level (at the end of 2011), according to Table 1 in Alves et al. (2013),
credit claims (direct credit from one bank to another) and debt securities represent 90%
of exposures. The remainder is composed of "other assets". For the 6 largest Canadian
banks (as at May 2008), there is a factor 4 between exposure through traditional lending
and exposure through cross-shareholdings, as reported in Table 3 in Gauthier et al. (2012).
Stylized fact 4: In the case of large banks, lending exposures represent a major part
of exposures (between 80% and 90%). In other words, ΓL∗ ≈ α × (ΠK + ΓL∗), where
7See Furfine (2003) for USA, Wells (2002) for UK, Upper and Worms (2004) for Germany, Lublóy
(2005) for Hungary, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) for the Netherlands, Degryse and Nguyen (2007)
for Belgium, Toivanen (2009) for Finland, Gauthier et al. (2012) for Canada, Mistrulli (2011) for Italy
and Fourel et al. (2013) for France.
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K = (Ki)i=1,...,n, L∗ = (L∗i )i=1,...,n and α ∈ [80%, 90%]. However, cross-shareholdings can
not be neglected.8
3 Model, theoretical properties and network shape
We model the network formation in two steps. The first one -dealt with in this section-
concerns the modeling of the behavior of one institution, the state of the others being
given. The aim is to determine how a financial institution defines its balance sheet and
especially the interconnections knowing the main balance sheet elements of the other
ones. For instance, how does a new bank get interconnected to previously existing ones?
Or how does a bank adapt its balance sheet to modifications of the structure of others?
The second step concerns the whole network formation using the modeling of individual
behaviors and will be considered in Section 4.
Based on the framework introduced in the previous section, a one-period model is
built. Banks are risk-averse agents optimizing their balance sheet structure for the share-
holder’s interest at the initial date t = 0. The horizon is the final date t = 1.
The assumption that interconnections represent a long-term choice is a cornerstone
of our analysis. Interconnections are not motivated by any liquidity features: they corre-
spond to optimal choices in the long-run. Including liquidity-motivated interconnections
that stem from daily work of Asset Liability managers, as well as the interactions between
short-term and long-term interconnections, constitutes an ongoing work of ours.
A very important concern is the problem of reflexivity: how to technically manage
the fact that the choices of financial institutions are interdependent? The main issue
is that a complete Nash equilibrium modeling of the whole balance sheet structure -
interconnections, external assets and debt- is clearly wishful thinking. It triggers difficul-
ties, especially with respect to privately available information and anticipation formation.
Note that in models with Nash equilibrium such as in Babus (2007) or Acemoglu et al.
(2013), choices are only taken at the level of interconnections: all the other components of
the balance sheet are exogenous. This scope is arguably adapted in a short-term frame-
work but is clearly unsuitable from a long-term perspective. In order to circumvent a
complete game theoretic model, we adopt some simplifying assumptions backed up by
practical considerations.
3.1 Modeling strategy
We choose an efficient, albeit simple strategy: each financial institution is assuming that
the asset side of the other financial institutions is only composed of their external assets.
This implies that the institution optimizing its balance sheet is not taking into account the
future reactions of the other financial institutions. In this perspective, the optimization
program is not strategic. Apart from simplifying the resulting optimization program,
this strategy corresponds to sound assumptions for each financial institution and this for
several reasons.
8It is paramount to take the relative weight of share securities into account since they are more risky
than debt/lending: shareholders lose as soon as the financial institution has losses while a debt holder
is only affected if the losses of the financial institution are above its equity. For contagion analysis,
cross-shareholdings cannot be neglected.
11
Firstly, the information set used in the optimization program is very close to the
genuinely available one. Actually, bilateral exposures are private information. Publicly
available information for any major financial institution are the detailed income state-
ment and the balance sheet. For instance, return-on-asset, return-on-equity, cash, total
interbank assets, loans on the asset side, debt and equity on the liability side are eas-
ily extracted from the public financial communication of firms or published reports (see
Appendix A for an excerpt of the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding
Companies (BHCs) of Bank of America published by the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council9). Secondly, note that a large part of debt securities and shares
are traded on the secondary market. Therefore, Bank i cannot know exactly who its
creditors and shareholders are: Bank i knows its asset side but not the repartition of its
liability side. The part of tradable shares is called the floating equity. By analogy, we
call the floating debt the part of the debt traded on the secondary market.
Lastly, the absence of anticipation of reaction constitutes an approximation. As previ-
ously mentioned, there is no information on bilateral exposures. However, total interbank
assets represent about 5% or 10% of total assets.10 Each bilateral exposure should be
much smaller: 0.5% of total assets seems a reasonable upper bound. Therefore, when a
new bank gets interconnected, the new interconnections do not significantly modify its
balance sheet. It may trigger a reaction from its own counterparts but the effects can
be neglected by comparison to the risk borne in the external assets for instance. As we
will see in the simulation results, the reaction of counterparts only has a light influence
on each institution, leading to a rapid stabilization of the network. This provides an
indication that this assumption of absence of anticipation can be accepted as a first step
towards building more realistic models.
Then this assumption allows us to derive in the next subsection some strong and
tractable theoretical results.
3.2 Optimization program
Bank i is managed for the benefits of its investors (i.e. shareholders) who are risk-averse
and endowed with an initial capital K(0)i . The risk-aversion of the investors of Bank i is
represented by a utility function ui. We denote 1 − cpij (respectively 1 − cγj ) the floating
equity (respectively debt) of Bank j, for j = 1, . . . , n.
In line with our modeling strategy, we scale the total assets of Bank j by κj =
L
(0)
j +K
(0)
j
Ax
(0)
j + A`
(0)
j
.
These scaling factors compensate for the fact that we consider that the counterparts are
not interconnected. Thus, we get the following approximation for the equity of Bank i at
time t = 1:
K
(1)
i = max
[
Ax
(1)
i + A`
(1)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,j max
(
κj(Ax
(1)
j + A`
(1)
j )− L∗(1)j , 0
)
+
n∑
j=1
γi,j min
(
κj(Ax
(1)
j + A`
(1)
j ), L
∗(1)
j
)
− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)i , 0
]
. (5)
9http://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/help/HelpFinancialReport.htm
10For instance, on June 30, 2013, the proportion of interbank assets in the total assets is 3.4% for
Bank of America, 13% for JPM, 8.40% for Citigroup 8.3% for Wells Fargo, according to the Consolidated
Financial Statements for BHCs.
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If we denote by E0 the expectation computed at time t = 0, the optimization program
Pi of Bank i is
Pi :=

max E0
[
ui
(
K
(1)
i
)]
Ax
(0)
i , A`
(0)
i
L
(0)
i , ωi
pii,1, . . . , pii,n
γi,1, . . . , γi,n
such that (s.t.) Ax(0)i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j = K(0)i + L(0)i (BC)
K
(0)
i ≥ kAi Ax(0)i + kpi
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j + kγ
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j (SC)
A`
(0)
i ≥ kL l(ωi, L(0)i ) (LC)
Ax
(0)
i ≥ 0, A`(0)i ≥ 0, L(0)i ≥ 0
ωi ∈ [0, 1]
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 0 ≤ pii,j ≤ 1− cpij , 0 ≤ γi,j ≤ 1− cγj .
The constraint (BC) ensures the balance sheet equilibrium at the initial date. Note
that this constraint allows the network resulting from our formation process (see Section
4) to satisfy (1) for each institution. The inequalities (SC) and (LC) are respectively
the regulatory solvency and liquidity constraints presented in Section 2.2. BC, SC and
LC stand for Balance sheet Constraint, Solvency Constraint and Liquidity Constraint,
respectively.
3.3 Solution analysis
We define the position Pi of Bank i as the difference between its total assets (denoted by
Ai) and its nominal debt. Therefore, at time t = 1, P
(1)
i = A
(1)
i − L∗(1)i . If this difference
is positive, the position is simply the equity; if the difference is negative, the position
is the loss for creditors (while the equity is equal to zero in this situation). P can be
interpreted as the profit-and-loss.
The uniqueness of the solution usually requires the strict concavity of the objective
function. The concavity of ui ◦ K(1)i (where ◦ denotes the composition operator) is not
a necessary condition since we could expect that the integration operation makes the
expectation strictly concave even if ui ◦K(1)i is not strictly concave everywhere (see the
Appendix for more details). Moreover, it would impose conditions on FR. Thus, we look
for conditions on ui ◦K(1)i . Due to their limited liability, shareholders aim at maximizing
the expected utility of the equity. The latter is defined as K(1)i = max(P
(1)
i , 0), making
ui ◦K(1)i non-differentiable and introducing a level shape. An unfortunate consequence is
that for standard utility functions ui, ui◦K(1)i is not strictly concave and not even concave.
Then our strategy is to approximate the real equity by a function v(P (1)i ) to obtain the
concavity. From an economic perspective, it is satisfactory to consider a transformation
of the equity, as we will see in the following. Therefore, we decompose the analysis of
Pi into two steps. Firstly, we show that under mild assumptions there exists a solution
(Theorem 1). Secondly, we transform the optimization program Pi into a close one (P ′i)
for which existence and uniqueness are ensured (Theorem 2).
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3.3.1 Analysis of the exact optimization program
Contrary to usual optimization programs where the total wealth is exogenous, increasing
wealth by issuing debt is allowed in Pi. Therefore, intuitively, the main difficulty in
showing the existence of a solution is to show that Bank i has no gain in issuing an
infinite amount of debt. The argument is as follows. The equity is exogenously fixed.
Therefore, (SC) implies that the total value of risky assets is bounded. Thus, starting
from a specific amount of debt, the funding obtained by issuing more debt is necessarily
invested in the risk free liquid asset. But since the interest rate charged on the debt is
higher than the risk free rate, it is not profitable to issue debt to invest in liquid assets.
In other words, banks are expected to invest in risky assets: granting credit is the core
activity of banks.
All this goes to state the following proposition:
Theorem 1 (Existence of a solution to Pi). If
• (A1) the investors neglect interconnections among their counterparts;
• (A2) the utility function ui is continuous and strictly increasing;
• (A3) the distribution function FR is continuous. Moreover, the density fR is strictly
positive on [a,+∞)n, for some a ∈ R;
• (A4) the yield curve, rD, is continuous and strictly higher than the risk free rate;
then there exists a solution to Pi.
Assumption (A1) is both a technical assumption and a way to reflect the restricted
information available for each agent. Assumptions (A2), (A3) and (A4) are very common
in the literature and not restrictive.
3.3.2 Analysis of the approximated optimization program
As stressed before, it appears impossible to establish the uniqueness for Pi except in
particular cases of simple models for FR. We therefore consider an optimization problem
P ′i where the sole difference with Pi is that the objective function is the expected utility
of a strictly increasing transformation (denoted by v) of the position of Bank i, P (1)i .
Considering the position directly makes things easier. However, it means not taking into
account the limited liability which has some important implications. Indeed, it plays
the role of a protection against extreme events for the managers: they are impacted
by regular shocks but not by extreme ones. Some phenomena cannot be explained by
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macro-economic models ignoring limited liability. The optimization program P ′i is
P ′i :=

max E0
{
ui
[
v(P
(1)
i )
]}
Ax
(0)
i , A`
(0)
i
L
(0)
i , ωi
pii,1, . . . , pii,n
γi,1, . . . , γi,n
s.t. Ax(0)i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j = K(0)i + L(0)i (BC)
K
(0)
i ≥ kAi Ax(0)i + kpi
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j + kγ
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j (SC)
A`
(0)
i ≥ kL l(ωi, L(0)i ) (LC)
Ax
(0)
i ≥ 0, A`(0)i ≥ 0, L(0)i ≥ 0
ωi ∈ [0, 1]
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, 0 ≤ pii,j ≤ 1− cpij , 0 ≤ γi,j ≤ 1− cγj .
With this specification, the level aspect of the limited liability is removed and the
transformation v ensures flexibility. For instance, with v = Id, one considers the usual
maximization of the expected utility of profits. Alternatively, v can be chosen to closely fit
the design of the limited liability of shareholders while relaxing their complete indifference
for loss magnitude. In the latter case, P ′i is very close to Pi.
In short, the argument for the existence of a solution of P ′i is similar to the argument
for the existence of a solution of Pi. The uniqueness mainly stems from the strict concavity
of the objective function we obtain by adjusting v. However, the strict convexity of the
constraints is necessary, imposing restrictions on the functional form of (LC) (see the
proof for details). The following theorem provides the result regarding uniqueness:
Theorem 2 (Existence and uniqueness of a solution to P ′i).
Under (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4) and the extra assumptions:
• (A5) the composition of the transformation function v and the utility function ui is
strictly concave: ∀P ∈ R, (ui o v)′′(P ) < 0;
• (A6) the interest rate on debt is strictly concave: ∀ωi ∈ [0, 1], r′′D(ωi) < 0;
• (A7) the interest rate on debt satisfies ∀ωi ∈ [0, 1], r′D(ωi) 6= 0;
• (A8) the function l in (LC) satisfies
∂2l
∂ω2i
≥ 0 and ∂
2l
∂ω2i
∂2l
∂L
(0)
i
2 ≥
(
∂2l
∂ωi∂L
(0)
i
)2
;
there exists a unique solution to P ′i in the following sense. If all control variables appearing
on the asset side of Bank i are fixed apart from one variable, denoted by Ac(0)i , then there
is uniqueness of the triplet (Ac(0)i , L
(0)
i , ωi).
Note that the result of Theorem 2 is equivalent to saying that the main balance
sheet items are unique. Indeed, the value of total assets A(0)i , the degree of maturity
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transformation ωi and the debt L
(0)
i are unique. Due to the high number of control
variables on the asset side and the complexity of the problem, it seems impossible to
prove the uniqueness of all control variables (see the Appendix for more details). The
uniqueness for all control variables will be verified on simulations.
3.3.3 Approximation properties
As mentioned before, the transformation function v gives room for flexibility. Lemma
1 provides two specifications satisfying (A5), corresponding respectively to the position
and a very good approximation of the equity.
Lemma 1 (Some specifications of v and ui).
• i) If ∀P ∈ R, v(P ) = P , then (A5) reduces to u′′i < 0.
• ii) If ∀P ∈ R, v(P ) = log (exp(P ) + 1), then (A5) is satisfied for the utility function
ui = log.
The approximation corresponding to v(P ) = log (exp(P ) + 1) is shown in Figure 4.
As we can see, the approximation error is very low. In the perspective of maximizing
the utility, this function is probably even more satisfactory than the real equity. Indeed
the utility of the equity is equal to zero whatever the position if the position is negative.
In reality, one may think that the bank’s managers prefer a light insolvency situation
to a large one, for example for the sake of reputation. It is be difficult to find funding
to build a new project after letting an institution in a state of large insolvency. Our
approximation function is strictly increasing and therefore takes this aspect into account.
This is especially true for position values not too far away from the insolvency point.
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Figure 4: The solid line represents the equity and the dashed line displays the approxi-
mated equity using funtion v(P ) = log(exp(P ) + 1).
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Lemmas 2 and 3 provide a specification for the interest rate curve rD and the function
l appearing in (RC), respectively satisfying (A6) and (A8).
Lemma 2 (Specification of function rD).
An interest rate curve of the form
rD(ω) = α− β exp(ω), for ω ∈ [0, 1], (6)
satisfies (A6).
Lemma 3 (Specification of function l).
The function defined by
l(ω, L) = exp(ω) exp(L), for ω ∈ [0, 1] and L ∈ R+,
satisfies (A8).
3.3.4 Choice
Previous theoretical results provide different suitable specifications (especially of the func-
tion v) leading to a unique solution of the optimization program. In order to clarify the
presentation, let us make a clear recommendation of choice. The following result is di-
rectly derived from Theorem 2 and Lemmas 1, 3 and 2.
Corollary 1 (Existence and uniqueness to a solution of a specific optimization program).
Additionally to (A1)− (A4), let us consider:
• a logarithmic utility function
ui(x) = log(x), for x ∈ R;
• the following approximation of the limited liability of shareholders:
v(P ) = log (exp(P ) + 1) , for P ∈ R;
• the following liquidity constraint:
l(ω, L) = exp(ω) exp(L), for ω ∈ [0, 1] and L ∈ R+;
• the following interest rate curve:
rD(ω) = α− β exp(ω), for ω ∈ [0, 1].
Then, the associated optimization program P ′i has a unique solution.
To conclude this section, let us emphasize that all parameters and variables required
to perform the optimization can be obtained via publicly available data.
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3.4 Optimal interconnections
Previous theoretical results ensure that the bank’s maximization program has a (unique)
solution. However, we did not characterize this solution, in particular the interconnec-
tions. In this part, we show that under some conditions, it is optimal for a bank to get
interconnected. In this section, in order to simplify the presentation and to explain the
main features, we do not take into account the control variables A`i and ωi, as well as
the liquidity constraint (LC).
In order to start, let us consider a simplified case of a portfolio composed of a quantity
Ax and a quantity pi of assets having respectively random variables Rg and Rpig as gross
returns, under a solvency constraint.11 The penalization weights are respectively kA and
kpi. The corresponding optimization program is
PRA :=

max E
[
u(AxRg + piR
pi
g )
]
Ax, pi
s.t. kAAx+ kpipi ≤ 1
Ax ≥ 0
0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
.
The Karush, Kuhn and Tucker (KKT) Theorem (Karush, 1939; Kuhn and Tucker, 1951)
allows to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For the sake of simplicity, we denote f = E
[
u(AxRg + piR
pi
g )
]
. Under
the condition
∀Ax ∈ R+ and ∀pi ∈ [0, 1],
∂f
∂Ax
(Ax, pi)
kA
<
∂f
∂pi
(Ax, pi)
kpi
,
the optimal pi∗ is different from 0.
This shows that under the condition that the derivative of the expected utility with
respect to pi (relative to its corresponding weight) is higher than the one with respect to
Ax, the optimal pi∗ is strictly positive. Proposition 1 does not provide the solution but
gives an indication that interconnections can be strictly positive under some conditions.
This result can be generalized to a higher number of assets. Note that this illustrative
program does not contain any equality constraint. However, such a constraint can be
trimmed by replacing one control variable in function of the others. That reduces the
problem’s dimension. This point will be further detailed in the following.
Due to the high complexity of our optimization problem (high dimension and high
number of constraints), the KKT conditions are very numerous and therefore it seems
impossible to derive the solution in a closed form. We decompose the analysis in different
steps. We first consider a risk-neutral agent maximizing the value of its portfolio without
limited liability. Secondly, we consider the case of a risk-averse agent and finally the
limited liability is taken into account.
Risk-neutral agent without limited liability:
In the risk-neutral case, the utility function is the identity function. Therefore, we can
11For the sake of simplicity, the product piK of the complete program has been simplified into pi.
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consider the following optimization program:
PRN :=

max
(
AxE(Rg) + piE(K
(1))
)
Ax, pi
s.t. kAAx+ kpipi K(0) ≤ 1
Ax ≥ 0
pi ≥ 0
,
where K(1) is the equity value (book value) of another institution at time t = 1 and K(0)
is the equity value (market value) of this institution at time t = 0.
By using the same type of argument as in Proposition 1, it is easy to show that if
E(Rg) > 0 or
E(K(1))
K(0) > 0, then
• if E(Rg)
kA
>
E(K(1))
kpiK(0) , the unique solution is
(
Ax∗ =
1
kA
, pi∗ = 0
)
;
• if E(Rg)
kA
<
E(K(1))
kpiK(0) , the unique solution is
(
Ax∗ = 0, pi∗ =
1
kpiK(0)
)
;
• if E(Rg)
kA
=
E(K(1))
kpiK(0) , the solution is not unique.
Therefore, due to the solvency constraint, a risk-neutral agent only invests in the asset
having the highest return with respect to its specific regulatory weight in the solvency
constraint.
Let us now consider the case where a limit to the availability is introduced: the
constraint pi ≥ 0 is replaced by 0 ≤ pi ≤ c. In this case, if E(Rg)
kA
<
E(K(1))
kpiK(0) , pi
∗ =
min
(
c,
1
kpiK(0)
)
. Therefore, if c <
1
kpiK(0) , investing all in K
(0) does not bind the solvency
constraint. In this case (and if E(Rg) > 0), an investment in Ax completes the portfolio.
This result can be easily generalized to the case of n institutions and where it is possible to
invest in the debt Lj, j = 1, . . . , n, of the other institutions. This is done in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. Let us consider the following optimization program:
PRNG =

max
(
AxiE(Rg,i) +
∑n
j=1 piijE(K
(1)
j ) +
∑n
j=1 γijE(L
(1)
j )
)
Axi, piij, γij
s.t. kAAxi + kpi
∑n
j=1 piijK(0)j + kγ
∑n
j=1 γijL(0)j ≤ 1
Ax ≥ 0
0 ≤ piij ≤ cpi
0 ≤ γij ≤ cγ
.
To find this problem’s solution, let us sort in decreasing order the following returns (rel-
ative to their penalty weight):
E(Rg,i)
kA
,
E(K
(1)
j )
kpiK(0)j
(j = 1, . . . , n),
E(L
(1)
j )
kγL(0)j
(j = 1, . . . , n).
The optimal solution consists in investing as much as possible in the asset having the
highest return with respect to its regulatory weight. When this asset is not available any-
more, it is better to invest as much as possible in the second one, and so on. This is
repeated until the solvency constrained is binding.
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Risk-averse agent without limited liability
A risk-averse agent aims at decreasing the variance of its portfolio. To this purpose, it
is necessary to diversify. Therefore, in this case, we can expect an investment in many
assets, contrary to the "binary" investment described previously. This is confirmed by
numerical experiments.
Agent with limited liability
In the previous considerations, we did not take into account the limited liability as well as
the fact that equity and debt have very different features. Therefore, we could not see the
implications of the fact that the piij and the γij are related to very different instruments.
To pinpoint these implications, let us consider a stylized set-up with two banks. One
can identify four situations in which Bank 1 (or 2) is either solvent or in default. Table
3 reports these 4 states. Let us focus on the impact of limited liability for Bank 1. We
assume that Bank 1 builds interconnections with Bank 2 anyway (for example in order
to reduce its variance) and we discuss the distribution among shares and debt securities.
Bank 2 in default Bank 2 solvent
Bank 1 in default e11 e12
Bank 1 solvent e21 e22
Table 3: Banks’ states.
The expected utility of Bank 1 is written as follows
E(U1) = P(e11) PO(e11) + P(e12) PO(e12) + P(e21) PO(e21) + P(e22) PO(e22),
where P(e) is the probability of being in state e and PO(e) the associated payoff for Bank
1. Due to limited liability, PO(e11) = PO(e12) = 0. Thus
E(U1) = P(e21) PO(e21) + P(e22) PO(e22).
In the state e21, Bank 2 defaults, meaning that its equity is equal to zero. It is therefore
more interesting to invest in its debt. In the state e22, Bank 2 is solvent. Thus, if
the equity of Bank 2 has a higher return than its debt with respect to their regulatory
weights, Bank 1 prefers investing in the share securities of Bank 2, thus increasing the
pi12. If the correlation ρ between the external assets of both banks is highly positive, both
banks are likely to be solvent and to default simultaneously. That means that P (e21) is
very low, giving: E(U1) ≈ P(e22) PO(e22). In this situation, Bank 1 prefers investing in
share securities. On the contrary, if the correlation ρ between the external assets of both
Banks is highly negative, Bank 2 is likely to default when Bank 1 is solvent. In this case
E(U1) ≈ P(e21) PO(e21) and Bank 1 prefers investing in debt securities.
It is important to understand that the asymmetry between the cases ρ > 0 and
ρ < 0 is due to the limited liability feature. Indeed, let us assume that Bank 1 has no
limited liability and thus is not indifferent to losses. If ρ is highly positive, E(U1) ≈
P(e11) PO(e11) +P(e22) PO(e22). In state e11, Bank 2 defaults and it is better to invest
in its debt whereas in state e12, it is better to invest in its shares. Therefore, it can be
appropriate to invest in both instruments and thus the asymmetry disappears. The same
happens for a highly negative ρ.
However, keep in mind that this set-up is too minimal to show all the implications of
the limited liability.
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3.5 Cost of funding
In the considerations of Section 3.4, we assumed that the agent owns a sufficient amount
of wealth to invest until the solvency constraint is binding. However, the capital K(0)i
is very low compared to the total assets to invest (due to the regulatory weight values).
Thus, once the total capital has been used, the institution must raise debt in order to
continue to invest. Returns of shares and debt securities must be netted by the cost of
funding. To make the investment attractive (in terms of net returns), the cost of raising
debt should be lower than the returns of shares and debt securities.
Let us now state some results about the returns of investments in shares and debt
securities issued by other institutions, compared to their funding cost. For the sake of
simplicity of the interpretation, before stating the result for general functions ui and v,
we propose a result in the case where ui and v are the identity functions. It corresponds
to the case of a risk-neutral institution maximizing its position P (1)i .
Proposition 2 (Returns against opportunity cost, in the case of a risk-neutral institution
maximizing the expectation of its position).
• The expected return of a share issued by Bank j is larger than the cost of funding
of Bank i if and only if∫ +∞
−bj
aj
(aj + bjrj)fR,j(rj) drj > [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j , (7)
where aj = κjAx
(0)
j , bj = κj
(
Ax
(0)
j + A`
(0)
j (1 + rf )
)
−L∗j [1+rD(ωj)] and fR,j is the
marginal density of the net return of the external asset of Bank j.
• The expected return of the debt issued by Bank j is higher than the cost of funding
of Bank i if and only if∫ L∗j [1+rD(ωj)]−bj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + bj)fR,j(rj) drj + L
∗
jcj[1 + rD(ωj)] > [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j ,
where cj = P
(
rj >
L
∗(1)
j −bj
aj
)
.
Proposition 3 (Returns against opportunity cost, in the general case of an institution
maximizing the expectation of the utility of its equity).
• The expected return of a share issued by Bank j is larger than the cost of funding
of Bank i if and only if∫ +∞
− bj
aj
(ajrj + bj) w(rj) drj > [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj,
where
w(rj)
=
∫ +∞
r1=−∞
. . .
∫
rj−1
∫
rj+1
. . .
∫
rn
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn) fR(r1, . . . , rn) drn . . . drj+1 drj−1 . . . dr1,
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where
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn) =
∂(ui ◦ v)
∂P
(1)
i
.
• The expected return of the debt issued by Bank j is higher than the cost of funding
of Bank i if and only if
∫ L∗j [1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + dj)w(rj) drj + L
∗
j [1 + rD(ωj)])
∫ +∞
L∗
j
[1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
w(rj) drj
> [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj,
where dj = κj
(
Ax
(0)
j + A`
(0)
j (1 + rf )
)
and w(rj) has been defined above.
Equation (7) corresponds to the fact that E
[
K
(1)
j
]
− [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j > 0. Note that
in this formula, the return of only Bank j matters. It can be beneficial for Bank i to
increase its participation in Bank j if the return on equity of Bank j is higher than the
interest rate that Bank i must pay for its debt.
In the general case, the same type of inequality as (7) is obtained. However, it takes
the marginal utility (up to function v) into account via w(rj). For interpretation purpose,
let us assume that v = Id. For a given value of rj, the algebraic gain of increasing the
participation piij must be weighted by the marginal utility, which depends on the returns
of all institutions. Integrating this marginal utility with respect to all returns r1, . . . , rn
apart from rj yields the term w(rj). The risk aversion of Bank i is embedded in the term
w(rj).
The same type of argument applies in the case of the debt.
3.6 Testing of the diversification motive: the network shape
Let us now compare the consequences of Theorem 3 and Stylized Facts 2 and 3 on the
network shape, and discuss the impact of risk-aversion and limited liability.
A risk-neutral bank with unlimited liability gets interconnected to others by strict
mechanical behaviors: it seeks sequentially for the highest returns until binding the sol-
vency constraint. Consequently, the network shape is very structured and directive since
everyone gets interconnected in the same direction. Thus, in such a case, there is no
general shape.12 In other words, with risk-neutral banks and unlimited liability, the
diversification motive cannot provide interesting results.
In the case of risk-averse banks, the interconnections tend to shape a complete net-
work. Institutions carry out a diversification to decrease the variance, in addition to their
aim of obtaining higher returns. Note that a diversified portfolio has a lower variance
than a concentrated one.13 Therefore, even if all institutions have similar returns, it
can be beneficial to get interconnected. To significantly benefit from the diversification,
the variance reduction must be high enough: situations where the specific assets are not
12Nevertheless, with a particular set of returns, a star network can occur.
13If X and Y are two random variables with mean µ, variance σ2 and correlation ρ < 1, then
E(X + Y ) = 2µ = E(2X) whereas Var(X + Y ) = 2(1 + ρ)σ2 < 4σ2 = Var(2X).
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almost non-risky and/or where the correlation is negative are prone to yield a complete
network structure. These findings will be confirmed numerically in the next section. The
limited liability feature can modify the balance between shares and debt securities.
When considering risk-averse banks, the diversification motive generates complete
financial networks, such as those usually observed among major institutions. Therefore,
we cannot rule out diversification as explaining interconnections between key financial
players.14
4 Network formation and simulation results
In this section, we derive simulation results in order to assess the relevance of the diver-
sification motive for the financial network formation. First, we present the specification
that we use and our calibration strategy. Second, we develop a network formation process
taking advantage of the strong and tractable theoretical results obtained in the previous
section. Then, optimal choices for one financial institution and regarding the whole net-
work are analyzed.
4.1 Specifications
For the sake of simplicity, two banks are considered, i.e. n = 2. Each institution is
endowed with a capital amount of 1, i.e. K(0)i = 1, i = 1, 2. Both institutions have
x 7→ log(x) as utility function. An initial capital of 1 implies that the equity value
K
(1)
i , i = 1, 2, at the optimization horizon is about 1. Therefore, the objective function
is close to be linear over the most likely area, meaning that the banks are only slightly
risk-averse.
In order to properly understand the main features of our model, we exclude A` and
ω from the control variables. The interest rates paid by the two financial institutions,
denoted by rD,1 and rD,2 are therefore fixed. Moreover, the risk-free interest rate is set
to zero: rrf = 0.
Finally, note that the expectations are computed using Monte-Carlo techniques; 100 000
simulations ensure a good precision.
4.2 Calibration strategy
The gross returns on external assets follow a bivariate log-normal distribution:
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In order to calibrate the mean parameter, we consider the income statement in the Con-
solidated Financial Statements for BHCs (reporting form FR Y-9C) for banks over $10
billion. Between 12/31/2010 and 12/31/2012, the (annual) net income varies from 0.51%
to 0.71% of the total assets. We round this value, considering that on average the net
14Note that our approach has no clue on the relevance of the other motives mentioned in Introduction.
We simply show that diversification provides consistent results with empirical observations.
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income of our banks is equal to 1%. Over the same period, the interest expenses repre-
sent between 0.74% and 1.07% of the total assets.15 We basically consider that the cost
of debt (rD,1 and rD,2) varies between 0% and 1%. Finally, the expected return of the
external assets for Bank i is equal to 1% + rD,i`i, where `i is the Bank i’s ratio of debt
over total assets. For the variance parameter, a probability of default of 0.1% is in line
with the current rating of major banks. We combine the informations relative to the net
income and the probability of default to compute the parameters µi and σi, i = 1, 2 (see
Appendix E for details). The parameter ρ lies between -0.9 to 0.9. A negative ρ can
be interpreted as a sign of competition between the two banks or as the fact that banks
operate in different markets (or geographical areas). Meanwhile, a positive ρ could be
interpreted as an underlying common factor affecting both banks.
We consider the Basel 2 regulation. This regulation does not provide a unique set of
values for the risk weights kAi , kpi and kγ. If the external assets correspond to a retail
activity (i.e. loans to households), loans to unrated firms (i.e. small firms) or quoted
shares, the required capital is equal to 6%, 8% or 23.2% of the total exposure, respectively.
For debt securities issued by banks, the required capital is equal to 1.6% (when AAA
or AA rated) or 4% (when A rated). Lastly, as discussed in Repullo and Suarez (2013),
there is a factor between the regulatory capital and the (accounting) equity, that varies
from 1 to 2. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that the regulatory capital is either
equal to the equity or to a half of the equity. Bottom line, we have 8 possible sets of risk
weights.
4.3 Discussion about the pricing of shares and debt securities
Recall that the position of Bank 1 at time t = 1 is as follows if Bank 2 is solvent:
P
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The terms K(0)2 and L(0)2 are respectively the market values of the share securities and
debt securities issued by Bank 2 at time t = 0. In a complete market and with the usual
assumptions, the price of an asset would be the discounted expected payoff under the
risk-neutral probability:
K(0)2 =
ERN [K
(1)
2 |F0]
1 + rrf
,
where F0 denotes the available information at time t = 0. Since ∀t ∈ [0, 1], K(t)2 =
max
[
κ2Ax
(t)
2 − L∗2(1 + rD,2), 0
]
, K2 appears as a call option whose underlying is Ax2 and
whose strike is L∗2(1 + rD,2). However, since Ax is the price of an illiquid asset, it is
difficult to argue that there exists a unique probability (the risk-neutral probability) that
makes Ax a martingale. Therefore, we choose to consider that the price is the discounted
15In this paper, we consider that the total assets are equal to the earning assets and to the average
assets.
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expected payoff under the physical probability. The corresponding prices K(0)2 and L(0)2
are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If we assume that log
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function of the standard Gaussian variable.
In order to understand some implications of our pricing choice, consider a situation
where all returns are deterministic and r2 > rD,2. In such a framework, we have
K(0)2 =
κ2Ax2(1 + r2)− L∗2(1 + rD,2)
1 + rrf
and L(0)2 =
L∗2(1 + rD,2)
1 + rrf
.
Therefore, injecting these prices in (9), we obtain
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Generally, we have rD,1 > rrf , meaning that the factors of pi12 and γ12 are negative and
thus that the net yields on shares and debt securities are negative. Therefore, for a
risk-neutral agent (i.e. not interested in variance reduction), it would not be optimal to
invest in shares and debt securities. That stems partly from the fact that we have priced
these instruments using the physical probability. Under the latter probability, the shares
and debt securities yield in average the risk-free rate. This feature could of course be
challenged. Note that we should pay attention to the interpretations based on (10) since
(10) only gives the expression of the position in a very simplified case. Equation (10)
must only be considered as an indication.
Contrary to the share and debt security prices, the initial value of Ax1 does not take
the future returns into account. As we already mentioned, Ax1 is an illiquid asset that
cannot be exchanged on the market. Therefore, the assumption of absence of arbitrage is
not necessarily satisfied and we price Ax1 using its book value. Since generally r1 > rD,1,
the specific asset Ax1 provides a positive return. This is logical since getting positive
returns via maturity transformation constitutes the core business of banks. However,
in the pricing of K(0)2 , we consider the future returns of Ax2. This asymmetry can be
discussed but it is difficult to find an ideal solution given the close link between a market
asset (K(0)2 ) and an illiquid asset (Ax2) in our model.
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4.4 Methodology for the network formation
The optimization programs Pi and P ′i presented in Section 3 allow computing the balance
sheet of an institution, knowing the state of the others. Here the aim is to build a complete
network using this individual optimization program. To this purpose, we operate in a
sequential way until an equilibrium in the network is reached.
We propose to use an iterative game. At each step, one institution optimizes its
balance sheet taking into account the state of the network obtained at the previous step.
Thanks to Corollary 1, there exists only one network at each step. The procedure is as
follows16:
1. Bank 1 optimizes its balance sheet on Ax1 and L∗1. Quantities pi1,2 and γ1,2 are
forced to be equal to zero since at the initialization step, Bank 2’s balance sheet is
totally unknown;
2. Bank 2 optimizes its balance sheet on Ax2, L∗2, pi2,1 and γ2,1 given Bank 1’s balance
sheet from step 1;
3. Bank 1 optimizes its balance sheet on Ax1 ,L∗1, pi1,2 and γ1,2 given Bank 2’s balance
sheet from step 2. pi1,2 and γ1,2 are optimized for the first time;
4. Bank 2 optimizes its balance sheet on Ax2, L∗2, pi2,1 and γ2,1 given Bank 1’s balance
sheet from step 3;
5. Bank 1 optimizes its balance sheet on Ax1 ,L∗1, pi1,2 and γ1,2 given Bank 2’s balance
sheet from the previous step;
6. and so on.
For further details, see Appendix D.
Theoretically, this procedure may be endless. However, in less than 10 steps, the
variations of the control variables from one step to the next are lower than 1% and we
consider that the final situation constitutes an equilibrium. Moreover, if we accept the
numerical argument for the existence of the limit-network, we can affirm its uniqueness.
Indeed, if at each step the network is unique, then its final state is necessarily unique. It
is interesting to note that this method is inspired by the classical methodology used to
determine a Nash equilibrium (in the sense that no institution has any interest in deviating
from its current state). However, further investigations would be required to know if the
network obtained by our method effectively corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
Last but not least, it is important to check that the obtained network is consistent
in the sense that it satisfies (1) and (2). Firstly, at time t = 0, all banks considered in
the network are solvent; otherwise they would disappear from the network. That means
that the initial debt equals the contractual one: L(0)i = L∗i , i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore, (2)
is automatically satisfied for each institution. Moreover, at each step, being a constraint
of the optimization program, (1) is satisfied for the bank optimizing its balance sheet.
If preliminary, this step has impacts on the other banks’ balance sheets and (1) is not
exactly satisfied anymore for them. Nevertheless, after some iterations, the network does
not evolve from one step to the next (due to the convergence), implying that (1) is
16Note that this formation process can be applied in the general framework of Section 3 but is here
presented using the previously mentioned specification.
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satisfied for all institutions. These two points show that the obtained network is actually
consistent.
This sequential algorithm could appear a little artificial but it is actually close to what
happens in reality. An example of a real formation process of a network is as follows:
1. Consider an initial situation where there is no bank;
2. A first bank, denoted by B1, is created during year t = 0. Since there are no other
banks, there are no possible interconnections. Thus, B1 optimizes Ax1 and L1. On
January 1st of year t = 1, B1 publishes its balance sheet;
3. Imagine that on January 3rd, a second bank B2 is created. B2 knows Ax1 and L1
and then can solve the optimization program to determine Ax2, L2, pi2,1 and γ21.
Once proportions pi2,1 and γ2,1 have been determined, B2 can buy on the secondary
market shares and bonds issued by B1 in these proportions;
4. On June 1st, B1 and B2 publish their balance sheets (apart from interconnections).
Since the balance sheet of B1 did not evolve since January 1st, B2 has no new
optimization to carry out. On the other hand, B1 discovers for the first time
informations relative to B2: Ax2 and L2. Then B1 optimizes its balance sheet and
thus obtains Ax1, L1, pi12 and γ12. B1 can buy on the secondary market shares and
bonds issued by B2;
5. On January 1st of year t = 2, balance sheets of B1 and B2 are published. The
balance sheet of B2 did not change and thus B1 has no optimization to do. On the
other hand, B2 must adapt to the new balance sheet of B1;
6. and so on.
After such iterations, one may think that there is convergence to an equilibrium in the
network. Balance sheets of B1 and B2 do not evolve a lot from one step to the next.
4.5 Simulation results about the optimal choice for one institu-
tion
Let us here focus on the second step of the iterative game where Bank 2 optimizes its
whole balance sheet (knowing the choice of Bank 1 at step 1). We assume that Bank
1’s external assets are equal to 10. We present the sensitivity of the optimal choices of
external assets Ax2, nominal debt L∗2 and interconnections pi2,1 and γ2,1, with respect to
the regulatory parameters and correlation ρ. Our computations were carried out under
various debt-issuing conditions (not costly with rD,1 = rD,2 = rrf = 0, both costly with
rD,1 = rD,2 = 1% > rrf = 0 and only one costly with rD,1 = 1% > rD,2 = rrf = 0) and we
observe that the results are independent of these conditions. In each set-up, we consider
the 8 sets of risk-weights and we let the correlation parameter vary between −0.9 and
+0.9.
The corresponding results are summarized in Table 4. First, we observe that inter-
connections based on debt securities are never used. A direct consequence is that the
risk weight on debt, kγ, has no impact on the balance sheet and thus does not appear in
Table 4. Second, interconnections based on share securities are used only when the cor-
relation is lower than -0.3 (independently of the interest rates) and when the associated
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risk weight is equal to 23.2%. They linearly decrease from about 45% to 0% between
ρ = −0.9 and ρ = −0.3. Third, the solvency constraint is binding. The optimal external
assets represent about 1/kA. The last row-block displays the ratio of interbank assets
over the total assets: when interconnections are present, their proportion in the total
assets is in line with the stylized facts.
These results could be interpreted as follows. First, the bank plays its core business: it
invests as much as it can in its external assets. Then, if the regulation is not too strict and
if the competitor’s results are sufficiently anti-correlated, the bank opts for diversification:
it slightly lowers its external assets to buy share securities issued by the competitor.
Debt securities are not used since their net returns are negative (as a consequence of the
pricing specification described in Section 4.3) and "nearly" deterministic (due to the low
probability of default).
kpi kA ρ = −0.9 ρ = −0.6 ρ = −0.3
Ax 23.2% 6% 14 15 16
23.2% 8% 11 12 11
46.4% 12% 8 8 8
46.4% 16% 6 6 6
pi 23.2% 6% 45 25 0
(%) 23.2% 8% 45 25 0
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
γ 23.2% 6% 0 0 0
(%) 23.2% 8% 0 0 0
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
IBA/TA 23.2% 6% 3.1 1.6 0
(%) 23.2% 8% 3.9 2.0 0
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
Table 4: Stylized results for the optimal choice of one institution, when rD,1 = rD,2 = 0.
4.6 Iterative game results
The iterative game reaches an equilibrium in less than 5 steps. The features pictured
in the analysis of the behavior of one institution are still present. Especially, results are
robust to the debt-issuing conditions.
Both institutions have the same balance sheet, whose composition is given in Table
5. Results are very similar to those for one institution only (Table 4). In particular,
the proportion of interbank assets in the total assets is in agreement with the sylized
facts. Note that for ρ = −0.9 and ρ = −0.6, the values of γ12 and γ21 are close to 10−4.
However, we have reported 0 since such low values do not have any economic meaning.
Let us state that these results have been obtained using κi = 1, i = 1, 2, in order
to avoid numerical instability. Indeed, if the values of κi become too large, it makes no
sense anymore to assume that the asset side of the other banks is only composed of their
external assets.
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kpi kA ρ = −0.9 ρ = −0.6 ρ = −0.3
Ax 23.2% 6% 15 15 16
23.2% 8% 11 12 12
46.4% 12% 8 8 8
46.4% 16% 6 6 6
pi 23.2% 6% 70 45 16
(%) 23.2% 8% 60 35 6
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
γ 23.2% 6% 0 0 0
(%) 23.2% 8% 0 0 0
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
IBA/TA 23.2% 6% 3.2 2.3 1
(%) 23.2% 8% 3.6 2.4 0.5
46.4% 12% 0 0 0
46.4% 16% 0 0 0
Table 5: Stylized results for the iterative game, when rD,1 = rD,2 = 0.
4.7 Testing the diversification motive
Regarding the capacity of the diversification motive to account for interconnections, the
previous results provide a quantitative assessment completing the qualitative arguments
developed in Section 3. The key result is that when returns on specific assets are anti-
correlated, diversification leads to interconnections with reasonable size in terms of pro-
portion of the total assets. However, debt securities are never used, meaning that inter-
connections are only supported by share securities. This portfolio composition contrasts
with empirical findings.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that in our simulation study, the choice of
pricing shares and debt securities under the physical probability has large impacts. As
explained in Section 4.3, it implies that the net yields of shares and bonds are negative.
Therefore, in this framework, interconnections only allow for variance reduction but not
for gain opportunity. We can expect this feature to be modified if the pricing is done
under the risk-neutral probability. Interconnections in both shares and debt securities
could then be observed, even for values of ρ larger than−0.3. The study of the risk-neutral
specification constitutes an ongoing work. In some sense, these two types of specification
for the pricing allow disentangling the two aims of the diversification: variance reduction
and opportunity.
The latter discussion shows that our model seems promising but that results are
very sensitive to the different possible specifications. Moreover, one feature that is not
included in our model for the sake of simplicity may partly explain the discrepancy
regarding debt securities. In reality, there are additional constraints -apart from the
required capital- imposed to large shareholders, such as mandatory public communication.
These constraints could discourage banks to invest in shares and could instead lead to
higher investments in debt securities.
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5 Application: impact of interconnectedness regula-
tion
The diversification motive has proven an interesting explanation of the bank size (Stylized
Fact 1), the network shape (Stylized Facts 2 and 3) and the composition of interconnec-
tions (Stylized Fact 4). Previous results concern the initial network resulting from banks’
choices based on their expectations. Due to the endogenous feature of interconnections,
we can build some plausible counterfactual scenarios, allowing to analyze the impact of
regulation on the welfare at time t = 1.
5.1 Assessing interconnections
The interconnectedness across financial institutions has become a key concern of super-
visors and regulatory authorities. Currently, long-term interbank exposures are covered
by two main requirements. The first one concerns the solvency required capital for the
interconnections, as for any other assets. It imposes a constraint on the total interbank ex-
posure. The second one concerns "large" single exposures and imposes the risk-weighted
exposure to be lower than a fraction of the equity.17 Currently, the Basel Committee
considers that an exposure is large if above 5% (instead of 10%) of the equity and to
impose that the risk-weighted exposure (kpipiijKj + kγγijLj for the exposition to Bank j)
has to be lower than 25% of the equity (see BCBS, 2014, Section II and Section IV.B).
These requirements are valid for any type of exposure (e.g. corporate or sovereign) but
the weights can vary with respect to the type. Moreover, the Basel Committee proposes
to introduce tighter rules about interbank exposures for the G-SIBs (Global Systemati-
cally Important Banks). An upper bound between 10% and 15% instead of 25 % is in
discussion (see BCBS, 2014, Section V). These tighter rules about interbank exposures
aim at reducing the risk of contagion.
These different aspects show that interconnectedness is generally assessed in a nega-
tive way. Actually, supervisors are primarily concerned with excessive risks and therefore
either analyze the effects of interconnections under depressed scenarios (stress-test ap-
proach) or build indicators in order to monitor the current fragility of the financial sectors.
In both approaches, interconnectedness usually means contagion only. For instance, the
seminal papers about network stress-tests -such as Furfine (2003) on US data or Upper
and Worms (2004) on German data- sequentially consider the effects in their national
banking sectors of the default of each bank. From their point of view, interconnected
banks are likely to trigger defaults or to go bankrupt due to contagion.
Nevertheless, these analyses are not built on counterfactuals. They certainly give
informative insights about what could happen within the current network in the case
of defaults of some institutions or difficult macroeconomic conditions. However, since
the network reaction is not taken into account, such studies do not really provide any
clue on the way to obtain a more resilient network structure. Moreover, note that the
question of regulation impact has hardly been addressed quantitatively, even in the case
of a crystallized network.
The endogenous nature of interconnections in our model precisely allows us to study
how the network reacts to tough macroeconomic conditions or to assess the impact of
regulation on interbank exposures, for instance of the regulation in discussion at the
17We do not distinguish equity, own funds and regulatory capital.
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Basel Committee. In the following, we focus on the impact of regulatory changes. To
do so, we consider our 8 sets of regulatory weights associated to interbank exposure (kA,
kpi and kγ).18 For each specific set, the initial network is derived using our formation
process. This step accounts for the diversification motive. Then we simulate returns
of the external assets and examine the network at time t = 1. Let us emphasize that
the shocks are properly propagated through the real interconnections.19 The unique set
of values Ki and Li (see Proposition 5) is determined using the algorithm described in
Appendix F. This allows us to carry out a fair assessment of contagion. To do so, we
build a welfare indicator including an explicit concern for the real economy and examine
its sensitivity to the regulatory set of weights.
5.2 Welfare analysis
We adapt the welfare analysis by Repullo and Suarez (2013) to assess the impact of the
regulatory parameters on the real economy.
The contribution of one bank is either negative or positive. When a bank defaults, its
contribution is negative and proportional to the loss on its debt. This feature encompasses
the cost of deposit insurance. When a bank is solvent, its contribution is the volume of
external assets, i.e. the lendings provided to the real economy. This component captures
the capacity to finance the real economy. The contribution of Bank i is written
wi = −c
(
L
∗(1)
i − L(1)i
)
+ Ax
(1)
i ,
where c is the social cost for deposit insurance (in Repullo and Suarez (2013), c varies in
[0, 60%]).
Our welfare indicator W is the ratio of the contribution of all banks over the initial
lending to the real economy:
W =
w1 + w2
Ax
(0)
1 + Ax
(0)
2
=
Ax
(1)
1 + Ax
(1)
2 − c
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∗(1)
1 − L(1)1 + L∗(1)2 − L(1)2
)
Ax
(0)
1 + Ax
(0)
2
.
For c = 0, the welfare is given in Table 6. When there are interconnections, the welfare is
higher than 1, indicating an increase of the banking capacity to lend to the real economy.
In contrast, when there is no interconnection, the value of the external assets decreases.
A complete analysis of the impact of interconnections would require further studies.
However, these results suggest that the interconnections stemming from diversification
are beneficial for the real economy.
6 Concluding remarks
A diversification motive appears as a sound candidate to account for long-term exposures
across financial institutions. The first aim of this paper is to test this assumption.
To this purpose, we build a model of financial network in which the balance sheets of
all institutions (including interconnections) are totally endogenous apart from the equity.
18In reality only 4 since with the specification chosen, kγ has no impact.
19Contrary to the assumption -used in the individual optimization program- that banks do not consider
interconnections of their counterparts.
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kpi kA ρ = −0.9 ρ = −0.6 ρ = −0.3
Sum of contributions 23.2% 6% 29.9 30.9 32.4
23.2% 8% 22.8 23.6 24.8
46.4% 12% 15.6 15.6 15.6
46.4% 16% 11.9 11.9 11.9
Welfare (%) 23.2% 6% 101.0 101.0 101.0
23.2% 8% 101.0 101.0 100.8
46.4% 12% 93.4 93.4 93.4
46.4% 16% 95.6 95.6 95.5
Table 6: Welfare.
The network formation process involves two components. The first one explains how a
bank optimizes its balance sheet knowing the state of the other banks in the network. We
prove the existence and partial uniqueness of the solution of this optimization. The second
part shows how to form the network using the individual optimization program. The
existence and unicity of this network are shown by numerical arguments. An important
feature of our model is its ability to account for the main features of the banking and the
insurance business with the same set of parameters. Nevertheless, we focus in this paper
on the banking business.
Secondly, the characteristics of the resulting network are compared to features usually
observed. As to the shape of the network, we theoretically find that the diversification
motive leads to a network close to those observed across big banks. Regarding the
size and support of the interconnections, we show that a correct magnitude is reached
under standard calibration. Moreover, the results are sensitive to some specifications, for
example the pricing method of shares and debt securities.
The fact that our network is totally endogenous allows studying how it adapts to
regulatory changes. Thus, the second aim is to apply our model to fairly assess the
impact of regulation on interbank exposures. To this purpose we study the evolution of
the welfare with respect to the regulatory weights kA and kpi. We observe that the welfare
is higher under regulations favoring interconnections.
Ongoing work includes the complete study in the case of insurance companies and
the extension to short-term interconnections. An exhaustive sensitivity analysis of the
obtained network with respect to macroeconomic parameters like the returns’s means as
well as other specifications -e.g. concerning the pricing of shares and debt securities- are
also under study. Finally, a simulation exercise in the case of 3 or 4 banks would also be
of great interest.
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A Example of public information on banks’ balance
sheets
Figure 5: Excerpt of the Consolidated Financial Statements for BHCs of Bank of America
at 06/30/2013. Source: www.ffiec.gov.
B The model of Gouriéroux et al. (2012)
In this part, we expose the model of Gouriéroux et al. (2012), that provides the conditions
defining an equilibrium between n financial institutions intertwined through shares and
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debt securities.
B.1 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Proposition 5. Let us denote by K = (Ki)i=1,...,n, L = (Li)i=1,...,n, L∗ = (L∗i )i=1,...,n,
Ax = (Axi)i=1,...,n and A` = (A`i)i=1,...,n. There exists a unique liquidation equilibrium,
that is a unique set of values for K and L for any given values of L∗, Ax, A` if for all
i, j = 1, . . . , n:
• (A1′) we have pii,j ≥ 0, γi,j ≥ 0;
• (A2′) we have Axi ≥ 0, A`i ≥ 0, L∗i ≥ 0;
• (A3′) we have
n∑
i=1
pii,j < 1,
n∑
i=1
γi,j < 1.
Proof. See Gouriéroux et al. (2012).
Assumptions (A1′) and (A2′) define a proper space for the parameters: all elements
composing the balance sheet must obviously be non-negative.
Assumption (A3′) means that some shareholders and creditors do not belong to the
perimeter of the selected financial institutions. In practice, the first part of (A3′) is
generally satisfied providing that we consider consolidated groups. Indeed, the empirical
evidence in the studies by Gauthier et al. (2012) and Alves et al. (2013) clearly shows that∑n
i=1 pii,j < 1. The constraint on the γij is largely satisfied since core deposits (deposits
from external agents) represent approximately 55% of a bank’s debt.
B.2 Case of two financial institutions
For illustrative purposes, let us consider a network of two institutions whose balance
sheets are shown in Table 7. In such a case the equilibrium equations (1)-(2) are
K1 = max
(
pi1,1K1 + pi1,2K2 + γ1,2L2 + A`1 + Ax1 − L∗1, 0
)
,
L1 = min
(
pi1,1K1 + pi1,2K2 + γ1,2L2 + A`1 + Ax1, L
∗
1
)
,
K2 = max
(
pi2,1K1 + pi2,2K2 + γ2,1L1 + A`2 + Ax2 − L∗2, 0
)
,
L2 = min
(
pi2,1K1 + pi2,2K2 + γ2,1L1 + A`2 + Ax2, L
∗
2
)
.
(11)
One can identify 4 regimes depending on the situations of Institutions 1 and 2, respec-
tively. These regimes, represented in Figure 6, are:
• Regime 1: both Institutions 1 and 2 are solvent;
• Regime 2: both Institutions 1 and 2 default;
• Regime 3: Institution 1 defaults while Institution 2 is solvent;
• Regime 4: Institution 1 is solvent while Institution 2 defaults.
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Institution 1 Institution 2
Asset Liability Asset Liability
pi1,1K1 L1 pi2,1K1 L2
pi1,2K2 K1 pi2,2K2 K2
γ1,2L2 γ2,1L1
A`1 A`2
Ax1 Ax2
Table 7: Balance sheets of Institutions 1 and 2.
Ax2 + A`2
Ax1 + A`1Ax
∗
1
Ax∗2
R2
R3
R4
R1
Figure 6: Regimes.
Figure 6 motivates the existence of interconnections between institutions. In a situ-
ation without interconnections, the 4 regimes would be defined by rectangles. Here the
bounds deviate due to the presence of interconnections. In the case where the external
assets of Institution 2, Ax2+A`2, are just above the limit value Ax∗2, if it is interconnected
and if Ax1 + A`1 is low, then Institution 2 can default (R2 is larger in the presence of
interconnections). In this case, interconnections have a negative effect since the predica-
ment of Institution 1 negatively impacts Institution 2 by contagion. When Ax2 + A`2
is very low, Institution 2 necessarily defaults if not linked to Institution 1. However, if
Institution 2 owns shares of Institution 1, Institution 2 can survive if the external assets’
value of Institution 1 is sufficient (R1 is larger in the presence of interconnections). In
such a case, Institution 2 takes advantage of the high yield investments of Institution 1.
Thus, we understand that the impacts of interconnections are not necessarily negative
and must be fairly assessed.
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C Proofs
C.1 For Theorem 1
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , n, let us denote the vectors of all control variables by X. We have
X =
(
Ax
(0)
i , A`
(0)
i , L
(0)
i , ωi, pii,1, . . . , pii,n, γi,1, . . . , γi,n
)′
∈ Xad,
where Xad is the admissible space satisfying all constraints of Pi. From now on, for the
sake of notational simplicity, we omit the dependence in i of the vectors containing the
control variables.
The proof relies on the Weierstrass Theorem: a continuous function on a compact set
reaches its bounds. Therefore, we first show the continuity of the objective function and
then the compactness of the admissible set Xad.
Continuity of the objective function
Under (A2) and (A3), both ui and FR are continuous. Therefore, the expectation is also
continuous and the objective function is continuous.
Compactness of the admissible set Xad
To prove the compactness of Xad, we show that it is a closed and a bounded set. Before,
we prove that Xad is not empty.
Xad is non-empty:
Let us consider the vector of parameters X0 defined as
X0 =
(
K
(0)
i − kLl(0, 0), kLl(0, 0), 0, . . . , 0
)′
.
All constraints apart from Axi ≥ 0, (BC), (SC) and (LC) are obviously satisfied. The
inequality Axi ≥ 0 imposes that K0i ≥ kLl(0, 0) which is not restrictive due to the low
value of kL and the fact that l(0, 0) can be taken equal to one. The constraint (BC)
reduces to K(0)i − kLl(0, 0) + kLl(0, 0) = K(0)i and is thus satisfied. The constraint (SC)
is written
K
(0)
i ≥ kAi Ax(0)i ⇐⇒ K(0)i ≥ kAi [K(0)i − kLl(0, 0)]
⇐⇒ K(0)i (1− kAi ) ≥ −kAi kLl(0, 0).
Due to the inequality kAi < 1 and the positivity of kAi , kL and function l, the left hand
term is positive whereas the right one is negative, giving that (SC) is satisfied.
Thus X0 belongs to the admissible set Xad, which is therefore not empty.
Xad is a closed set:
In order to show that the admissible set Xad is a closed set, we show that it is the
intersection of closed sets.
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i) The constraint (BC) can be written
Ax
(0)
i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j −K(0)i − L(0)i = 0.
The corresponding admissible space is the reciprocal image of the singleton {0}, which is
a closed set of R, by a continuous function. Therefore, (BC) defines a closed set.
ii) The constraint (SC) is derived in
kAi Ax
(0)
i + k
pi
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j + kγ
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j −K(0)i ≤ 0.
The corresponding admissible space is the reciprocal image of [−∞, 0], which is a closed
set of R, by a continuous function. Therefore, (SC) defines a closed set.
iv) The constraint (LC) is derived in
kL l(ωi, L
(0)
i )− A`(0)i ≤ 0.
The corresponding admissible space is the reciprocal image of [−∞, 0], which is a closed
set of R, by a continuous function. Therefore, (LC) defines a closed set.
v) The positivity constraints (Ax(0)i ≥ 0, A`(0)i ≥ 0 and L(0)i ≥ 0) also define closed
sets, as the reciprocal images of [0,+∞], which is a closed set of R, by a continuous
function.
vi) The constraints ωi ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ pii,j ≤ 1− cpij , 0 ≤ γi,j ≤ 1− cγj (∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n})
define a closed admissible set as the reciprocal images of [0, 1], [0, 1− cpij ] and [0, 1− cγj ],
which are closed sets of R, by a continuous function.
The admissible set Xad is the intersection of the admissible sets defined by each con-
straint. Moreover, an intersection of closed sets is a closed set. Thus, combining points
i) to vi), we obtain that Xad is a closed set.
Xad is a bounded set:
Let us show that the admissible set is bounded.
Conditions 0 ≤ pii,j ≤ 1− cpij and 0 ≤ γi,j ≤ 1− cγj (∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}) show that all the pii,j
and γi,j are bounded. The same is true for ωi ∈ [0, 1]. Let us now prove that A`i, Axi
and Li are bounded.
i) Bound for A`i
The combination of the constraints L(0)i ≥ 0 and (BC) implies that the institution invests
at least all its own capital.
If L(0)i = 0, K
(0)
i is an upper-bound for A`
(0)
i .
Let us now consider the case L(0)i > 0. The constraint (BC) can be used to express
the debt as a function of other control variables,
L
(0)
i = Ax
(0)
i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j −K(0)i .
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Using this last equation, one can express P (1)i as a function of other control variables:
P
(1)
i = Ax
(0)
i (1 + ri) + A`
(0)
i (1 + rrf )
+
n∑
j=1
pii,j max
(
κj[Ax
(0)
j (1 + rj) + A`
(0)
j (1 + rrf )]− L∗(1)j , 0
)
+
n∑
j=1
γi,j min
(
κj[Ax
(0)
j (1 + rj) + A`
(0)
j (1 + rrf )], L
∗(1)
j
)
− [1 + rD(ωi)]
(
Ax
(0)
i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK
(0)
j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL
(0)
j −K(0)i
)
= Al
(0)
i [rrf − rD(wi)] + d(X−A`, r), (12)
where X−A` =
(
Ax
(0)
i , L
(0)
i , ωi, pii,1, . . . , pii,n, γi,1, . . . , γi,n
)′
is the vector of all the control
variables apart from A`(0)i , r = (r1, . . . , rn)′ is the vector of the realized net returns of
the external assets and d is some function. The position P (1)i is a function of A`
(0)
i ,
X−A` and r, from now on denoted by P
(1)
i (A`
(0)
i ,X−A`, r). Assumption (A4) states that
rD(ωi) > rrf , giving that P
(1)
i (., ., .) is strictly decreasing with respect to A`
(0)
i .
Let us consider a value V1 > K
(0)
i for A`
(0)
i . From (12), we see that, for all admissible
X−A`, there exists a set ε1, . . . , εn of values such that, if rk ≥ εk, k = 1, . . . , n, then
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r) > 0. For a second value V2 such that K
(0)
i ≤ V2 < V1, we have for all
admissible X−A`
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r) > P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r). (13)
Therefore, if rk ≥ εk, k = 1, . . . , n, we have
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r) > 0. (14)
Now, let us compare the expected utility at A`(0)i = V1 and A`
(0)
i = V2. We have
E
[
ui
(
K
(1)
i
)]
(V1,X−A`) =
∫ +∞
−∞
. . .
∫ +∞
−∞
ui
(
max
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r), 0
])
fR(r) dr
=
∫ ε1
−∞
. . .
∫ εn
−∞
ui
(
max
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r), 0
])
fR(r) dr
+
∫ +∞
ε1
. . .
∫ +∞
εn
ui
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r)
]
fR(r) dr. (15)
By the same decomposition and using (14), we obtain, for A`(0)i = V2 > V1,
E
[
ui
(
K
(1)
i
)]
(V2,X−A`) =
∫ ε1
−∞
. . .
∫ εn
−∞
ui
(
max
[
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r), 0
])
fR(r) dr
+
∫ +∞
ε1
. . .
∫ +∞
εn
ui
[
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r)
]
fR(r) dr. (16)
Using (13), we have, for r ∈ (−∞, ε1]× · · · × (−∞, εn],
max
[
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r), 0
]
≥ max
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r), 0
]
,
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and, since ui is strictly increasing ((A2)),
ui
(
max
[
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r), 0
])
≥ ui
(
max
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r), 0
])
.
Using (13), we have, for all r ∈ [ε1,+∞)× · · · × [εn,+∞),
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r) > P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r),
and, since ui is strictly increasing,
ui
[
P
(1)
i (V2,X−A`, r)
]
> ui
[
P
(1)
i (V1,X−A`, r)
]
.
Moreover, there exists a ∈ R, such that, for all r ∈ [a,+∞)n, fR(r) > 0 ((A3)).
Therefore, combining (15) and (16) yields
∀ admissible X−A`, E
[
ui
(
K
(1)
i
)]
(V1,X−A`) < E
[
ui
(
K
(1)
i
)]
(V2,X−A`),
meaning that, for A`(0)i ≥ K(0)i , the objective function is strictly decreasing with respect
to A`(0)i . Consequently, Pi is equivalent if we upper-bound the space of A`i. Moreover,
since A`i is lower-bounded by 0, A`i is bounded.
ii) Bounds for Axi and Li
Let us recall that (SC) is written
K
(0)
i ≥ kAi Ax(0)i + kpi
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j + kγ
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j .
The equity K(0)i is fixed as an endowment. Moreover, in the right hand term of (SC), all
components are positive. Thus, it imposes that each term is bounded. Therefore, kAi Axi
is upper-bounded and, since kAi > 0 by assumption, Axi is upper-bounded. Moreover,
Axi ≥ 0 and thus Axi is bounded.
Using the fact that kpi > 0 and kγ > 0, we also obtain that both
n∑
j=1
pii,jK
(0)
j and
n∑
j=1
γi,jL
(0)
j are upper-bounded. Let us recall that (BC) gives
L
(0)
i = Ax
(0)
i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j −K(0)i ,
implying that L(0)i is upper-bounded since all terms in the right part of the equation are
upper-bounded. Moreover, since L(0)i ≥ 0 by assumption, L(0)i is bounded.
Existence
To summarize, the admissible set is not empty. It is also closed and bounded, and
therefore compact. The objective function is continuous and the Weierstrass Theorem
ensures the existence of a solution.
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C.2 For Theorem 2
Proof.
Existence
The existence can be shown exactly in the same way as for Theorem 1.
Uniqueness
The uniqueness is based on a fundamental theorem of optimization: a strictly concave
function on a closed convex set admits a unique maximum. We first show that the
admissible set is convex and then that the objective function is strictly concave.
Convexity of the admissible set
As before, we denote
X =
(
Ax
(0)
i , A`
(0)
i , L
(0)
i , ωi, pii,1, . . . , pii,n, γi,1, . . . , γi,n
)′
∈ Xad,
where Xad is the admissible space of P ′i.
Let us show that each constraint of P ′i defines a convex set. All constraints excluding
(LC) involve linear functions of the control variables and thus each of these constraints
obviously defines a convex set.
The constraint (LC) requires more attention. For the sake of notational simplicity,
let us denote by x = ωi, y = L
(0)
i and z = A`
(0)
i . The constraint (LC) can therefore
be re-written z > l(x, y). The corresponding set is the epigraph of the function l. The
epigraph is convex if and only if l is convex, i.e. if and only if the Hessian of l, Hl, is
semi definite positive. By definition, we have
Hl =

∂2l
∂x2
∂2l
∂x∂y
∂2l
∂x∂y
∂2l
∂y2
 .
The Sylvester’s criterion states that a matrix is semi definite positive if and only if all its
leading principal minors are positive, i.e.
∂2l
∂x2
≥ 0 and ∂
2l
∂x2
∂2l
∂y2
≥
(
∂2l
∂x∂y
)2
.
Thus, under (A8), (LC) defines a convex set and finally all constraints define a convex
set. Since the intersection of convex sets is a convex set, Xad is a convex set.
We want to show that there is uniqueness of the solution of the optimization of the
triple (Ac(0)i , L
(0)
i , ωi), where Ac
(0)
i is one of the variables appearing on the asset side, i.e.
among Ax(0)i , A`
(0)
i , pii,1, . . . , pii,n, γi,1, . . . , γi,n. Let us denote
X3 =
(
Ac
(0)
i , L
(0)
i , ωi
)′
∈ X3ad,
where X3ad is the admissible set of the three-dimensional optimization program. By using
the same arguments as for Xad, X3ad defines a convex set, whatever the control variable
Ac
(0)
i that is chosen. Moreover, note that one can show that X3ad is a closed set, as for
Theorem 1.
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Expectation and underlying objective function
In the following, we generally denote the position by P (1)i (X3, r) but sometimes we omit
the arguments X3 and r for simplicity. The strict concavity of ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
is a sufficient
condition to obtain the strict concavity of E
{
ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]}
with respect to X3. Indeed,
let us assume that ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
is strictly concave. Combining the latter assumption with
the fact that fR is strictly positive on [a,+∞)n ((A3)), we get, for all (X31,X32) ∈ X32ad
and for all λ ∈ [0, 1],
E
{
ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]}
(λX31 + (1− λ)X32)
=
∫
Rn
ui
(
v
[
P
(1)
i (λX31 + (1− λ)X32, r)
])
fR(r) dr
>
∫
Rn
[
λ ui
(
v
[
P
(1)
i (X31, r)
])
+ (1− λ) ui
(
v
[
P
(1)
i (X32, r)
]) ]
fR(r) dr
= λ E
{
ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]}
(X31) + (1− λ)E
{
ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]}
(X32),
showing the strict concavity of the expected utility.
Strict concavity of the underlying objective function
We now focus on ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
. We consider that only one control variable is free on the
asset side. For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote by x1 = Ac
(0)
i , x2 = ωi and
x3 = L
(0)
i . Here we interpret P
(1)
i as the function defined by
P
(1)
i : R
+ × [0, 1]×R+ → Rx1x2
x3
 7→ t(x1)− [1 + rD(x2)]x3,
where t(.) is a linear transformation mapping the control variable chosen into the value
of the total assets Ax(0)i (1 + ri) + Al
(0)
i (1 + rrf ) +
∑n
j=1 pii,jK(0)j +
∑n
j=1 γi,jL(0)j . Let us
denote by g the function ui ◦ v ◦P (1)i . We now study the strict concavity of g. We denote
by m = ui ◦ v, yielding g = m ◦ P (1)i . The function g is strictly concave if and only if its
Hessian matrix Hg is definite negative. We have
Hg = m
′′

1 −x3 r′D(x2) −[1 + rD(x2)]
−x3 r′D(x2) −x3
[
m′
m′′
r′′D(x2) + r
′2
D(x2)x3
]
r′D(x2)
[
−m
′
m′′
+ x3[1 + rD(x2)]
]
−[1 + rD(x2)] r′D(x2)
[
−m
′
m′′
+ x3[1 + rD(x2)]
]
[1 + rD(x2)]
2
 .
The Sylvester’s criterion states that Hg is definite negative if and only if all its leading
principal minors are strictly negative. Let us now study the three corresponding minors.
i) First minor
The first minor is
Det1 = |m′′|.
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According to the Sylvester’s criterion, m′′ < 0 is imposed.
ii) Second minor
The second minor is
Det2 = m′′2 ×
[
−x3
[
m′
m′′
r′′D(x2) + r
′2
D(x2)x3
]
+ x23 r
′2
D(x2)
]
.
Thus, the Sylvester’s condition imposes, ∀x2 ∈ [0, 1] and x3 ∈ R+,
x3
[
m′m′′r′′D(x2) +m
′′2r′2D(x2)x3
]
> x23r
′2
D(x2)m
′′2
⇐⇒ m′m′′r′′D(x2) +m′′2r′2D(x2)x3 > x3r′2D(x2)m′′2
⇐⇒ m′m′′r′′D(x2) > 0
⇐⇒ r′′D(x2) < 0,
since m′ > 0 by assumption (u and v are strictly increasing so m = u ◦ v is strictly
increasing as well) and the previous condition (see i) imposes m′′ < 0.
iii) Third minor
We compute the third minor using Sarrus’ rule. We obtain
Det3 = m′′3
{
− x3
[
m′
m′′
r′′D(x2) + r
′2
D(x2)x3
]
[1 + rD(x2)]
2
+ 2(−x3 r′D(x2)) r′D(x2)
[
−m
′
m′′
+ x3[1 + rD(x2)]
]
× (−[1 + rD(x2)])
−
[
[1 + rD(x2)]
2
(
− x3
[
m′
m′′
r′′D(x2) + r
′2
D(x2)x3
])
+ r′D(x2)
[
−m
′
m′′
+ x3[1 + rD(x2)]
]2
+ x23 r
′2
D(x2) [1 + rD(x2)]
2
]}
= m′′3
[{
2x3 r
′2
D(x2)[1 + rD(x2)] + r
′2
D(x2)
(
−m
′
m′′
+ x3 [1 + rD(x2)]
)} (
− m
′
m′′
+ x3[1 + rD(x2)]
)
+ x23 r
′2
D(x2)) [1 + rD(x2)]
2
]
.
Considering m′′ < 0 (see ii) and m′ > 0 (by assumption), we have
m′
m′′
< 0. Thus,
assuming ∀x2 ∈ [0, 1], r′D(x2) 6= 0, all terms in the brackets are strictly positive. Moreover
m′′3 < 0 and thus the condition Det3 < 0 is satisfied.
Summary
The following assumptions
• m′′(x) < 0 ((A5));
• r′′D < 0 ((A6));
• r′D 6= 0 ((A7));
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are sufficient to ensure that the Hessian matrix of g is definite negative and therefore
that g is strictly concave with respect to the control variable Ac(0)i , the debt L
(0)
i and the
maturity transformation ωi.
Finally, under (A5), (A6), (A7) and (A8), the objective function E
{
ui
[
v
(
P
(1)
i
)]}
is strictly concave on a closed convex set, showing the uniqueness.
Remark 1. Let us now come back to the choice of working directly on the integrand. Even
if ui ◦ v is not strictly concave everywhere, one may certainly expect the strict concavity
to come from the integration with respect to the realized returns r (for some appropri-
ate densities fR). However, as we have shown, studying the concavity of a multivariate
function involves studying its Hessian and this is already quite complicated in the case
of the integrand. The Hessian matrix of the expected utility implies much more compli-
cated expressions, especially products of integral, apart from the first leading minor. The
condition on this first leading minor is written as follows:∫
Rn
(ui ◦ v ◦ P (1)i )′′(X, r)fR(r) dr > 0.
Thus, even in the case of the first leading minor, it seems difficult to obtain results
except in particular cases of very simple density functions fR. Moreover, the study of the
uniqueness of all control variables (and thus the study of the strict concavity with respect
to all control variables) would require the study of a high dimensional Hessian, which is
very difficult.
C.3 For Lemma 1
Proof. i) We consider the function defined by ∀P ∈ R, v(P ) = P .
We have v′(P ) = 1 and v′′(P ) = 0. Thus, (ui ◦ v)′(P ) = u′i[v(P )]v′(P ) = u′i(P ), giving
(ui ◦ v)′′(P ) = u′′i (P ). Therefore, (A5) imposes ∀P ∈ R, u′′i (P ) < 0.
ii) Here, we consider the function defined by ∀P ∈ R, v(P ) = log (exp(P ) + 1).
We have, for all P ∈ R,
v′(P ) =
eP
eP + 1
and v′′(P ) =
eP (eP + 1)− eP eP
(eP + 1)2
=
eP
(eP + 1)2
.
Let us study the function h = ui ◦ v = log ◦v. We have
h′(P ) =
v′(P )
v(P )
,
and thus
h′′(P ) =
v′′(P ) v(P )− v′2(P )
v2(P )
=
eP
(eP + 1)2
1
log (eP + 1)
− e
P eP
(eP + 1)2
1
[log (eP + 1)]2
=
eP
(eP + 1)2
1
log (eP + 1)
(
1− e
P
log (eP + 1)
)
.
The first two factors are positive whereas the third one is negative (since ∀x ∈ R∗+, log(1+
x) < x). Consequently, ∀P ∈ R, h′′(P ) < 0. Hence the result.
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C.4 For Lemma 3
Proof. We consider the function defined by ∀ω ∈ [0, 1] and ∀L ∈ R+, l(ω, L) = exp(ω) exp(L).
We have
∀ω ∈ [0, 1] and ∀L ∈ R+, ∂
2l
∂ω2
= exp(ω) exp(L) > 0 and
∂2l
∂ω2
∂2l
∂L2
= [exp(ω) exp(L)]2 =
(
∂2l
∂ω∂L
)2
.
That shows that (A8) is satisfied.
C.5 For Proposition 1
Proof. The proof is based on the Karuch, Kuhn, Tucker (KKT) Theorem, which provides
necessary conditions on a local optimum of an optimization problem under equality and
inequality constraints. We show that assuming pi∗ = 0 leads to a contradiction.
The KKT Theorem states that there exist coefficients µi ≥ 0 such that a local maxi-
mum (Ax∗, pi∗) is a local maximum of the objective function La, defined as
La = f − µ1(kAAx+ kpipi − 1) + µ2Ax+ µ3pi − µ4(pi − 1),
where f is the initial objective function, i.e. E
[
u(AxRg + piR
pi
g )
]
. Moreover, the µi
coefficients satisfy
∀i, µiCi = 0,
where Ci is the i-th constraint.
At a local optimum, the KKT conditions are
∂f
∂Ax
− µ1kA + µ2 = 0
∂f
∂pi
+ µ3 − µ1kpi − µ4 = 0
µ1(k
AAx∗ + kpipi∗ − 1) = 0
µ2Ax
∗ = 0
µ3pi
∗ = 0
µ4(pi
∗ − 1) = 0
.
We now assume that pi∗ = 0. The last equation directly provides µ4 = 0. Since f is
strictly increasing, Ax∗ is necessarily strictly positive (such Ax∗ is compatible with the
constraints). Therefore, we have µ2 = 0. Thus, the first equation provides
µ1 =
∂f
∂Ax
1
kA
.
Injecting this result into the second equation gives
µ3 =
∂f
∂Ax
kpi
kA
− ∂f
∂pi
< 0 (by assumption). (17)
Equation (17) is in contradiction with the KKT theorem, stating that ∀i, µi ≥ 0. There-
fore, pi∗ 6= 0.
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C.6 For Proposition 2
Proof. First, let us recall that
P
(1)
i = Ax
(1)
i + A`
(1)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK
(1)
j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL
(1)
j
− [1 + rD(ωi)]
(
Ax
(0)
i + A`
(0)
i +
n∑
j=1
pii,jK(0)j +
n∑
j=1
γi,jL(0)j −K(0)i
)
= Ax
(1)
i + A`
(1)
i − [1 + rD(ωi)](Ax(0)i + A`(0)i −K(0)i ) +
n∑
j=1
pii,j
(
K
(1)
j − [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j
)
+
n∑
j=1
γi,j
(
L
(1)
j − [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
)
.
We have ui ◦ v = Id. Then the derivative of the objective function with respect to
pii,j is written
∂E[ui ◦ v(P (1)i )]
∂piij
=
∂E(P
(1)
i )
∂piij
= E
[
K
(1)
j − [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j
]
= E
[
K
(1)
j
]
−[1+rD(ωi)]K(0)j ,
(18)
where
K
(1)
j = max
(
κj
(
Ax
(1)
j + A`
(1)
j
)
− L∗(1)j , 0
)
.
Let us now explicit the latter expression:
κj
(
Ax
(1)
j + A`
(1)
j
)
− L∗(1)j = κj
(
Ax
(0)
j (1 + rj) + A`
(0)
j (1 + rrf )
)
− L∗j [1 + rD(ωj)]
= ajrj + bj,
by denoting aj = κjAx
(0)
j and bj = κj
(
Ax
(0)
j + A`
(0)
j (1 + rrf )
)
− L∗j [1 + rD(ωj)]
Then,
E
[
K
(1)
j
]
= E [max (ajrj + bj, 0)] =
∫ +∞
−bj
aj
(ajrj + bj) fR,j(rj) drj. (19)
Combining (18) and (19), we obtain
∂E[ui ◦ v(P (1)i )]
∂piij
> 0⇐⇒
∫ +∞
−bj
aj
(ajrj + bj) fR,j(rj) > [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j .
The derivative with respect to γij is written
∂E(P
(1)
i )
∂γij
= E[L
(1)
j ]− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
= E
[
min
(
ajrj + bj, L
∗(1)
j
)]
− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
=
∫ L∗(1)j −bj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + bj)fR,j(rj) drj + L
∗(1)
j P
(
rj >
L
∗(1)
j − bj
aj
)
− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
=
∫ L∗(1)j −bj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + bj)fR,j(rj) drj + L
∗
jcj [1 + rD(ωj)]− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j ,
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by denoting cj = P
(
rj >
L
∗(1)
j −bj
aj
)
. Finally,
∂E[ui ◦ v(P (1)i )]
∂piij
> 0⇐⇒
∫ L∗j [1+rD(ωj)]−bj
aj
−∞
(ajrj+bj)fR,j(rj) drj+L
∗
jcj [1+rD(ωj)] > [1+rD(ωi)]L(0)j .
C.7 For Proposition 3
Proof. Let us at first consider the derivative with respect to piij. We have
∂
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂piij
=
∂(ui ◦ v)
∂P
(1)
i
∂P
(1)
i
∂piij
.
The first term
∂(ui ◦ v)
∂P
(1)
i
can be interpreted as some kind of marginal utility (with the
utility being composed with function v). It depends on the returns of all banks connected
to Bank i and not only on the return of Bank j. Let us denote
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn) =
∂(ui ◦ v)
∂P
(1)
i
.
Moreover, we have
∂P
(1)
i
∂piij
= K
(1)
j − [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j = max (ajrj + bj, 0)− [1 + rD(ωi)] K(0)j .
Let us introduce
hi2(rj) =
∂P
(1)
i
∂piij
.
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Thus,
∂E
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂piij
= E
∂ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)
∂piij

=
∫ +∞
r1=−∞
. . .
∫
rj
. . .
∫
rn
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn) hi2(rj)fR(r1, . . . , rn) drn . . . drj . . . dr1
=
∫ +∞
rj=−∞
[∫
r1
. . .
∫
rj−1
∫
rj+1
. . .
∫
rn
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn)hi2(rj)fR(r1, . . . , rn) drn . . . drj+1 drj−1 . . . dr1
]
drj
=
∫ +∞
rj=−∞
hi2(rj)
[∫
r1
. . .
∫
rj−1
∫
rj+1
. . .
∫
rn
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn)fR(r1, . . . , rn) drn . . . drj+1 drj−1 . . . dr1
]
drj
=
∫ +∞
−∞
hi2(rj)w(rj) drj
=
∫ +∞
− bj
aj
(ajrj + bj)w(rj) drj −
∫ +∞
−∞
[1 + rD(ωi)]K(0)j w(rj) drj
=
∫ +∞
− bj
aj
(ajrj + bj)w(rj) drj − [1 + rD(ωi)]K(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj,
where
w(rj)
=
∫ +∞
r1=−∞
. . .
∫
rj−1
∫
rj+1
. . .
∫
rn
hi1(r1, . . . , rj, . . . , rn) fR(r1, . . . , rn) drn . . . drj+1 drj−1 . . . dr1.
Therefore,
∂E
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂piij
> 0⇐⇒
∫ +∞
− bj
aj
(ajrj + bj)w(rj) drj > [1 + rD(ωi)]K(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj.
Let us now consider the case of γij. As in the previous case, the corresponding
derivative is written
∂
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂γij
=
∂(u o v)
∂P
(1)
i
∂P
(1)
i
∂γij
.
The first term is equal to hi1(rj) and the second is denoted hi3(rj). The same computation
as in the case of piij yields
∂E
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂γij
=
∫ +∞
−∞
hi3(rj)w(rj) drj.
We have
hi3(rj) = L
(1)
j − [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j = min(ajrj + dj, L∗j [1 + rD(ωj)])− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j ,
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where dj = κj
(
Ax
(0)
j + A`
(0)
j (1 + rrf )
)
. Finally
∂E
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂γij
=
∫ L∗j [1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + dj)w(rj) drj + L
∗
j [1 + rD(ωj)])
∫ +∞
L∗
j
[1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
w(rj) drj
− [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj,
giving that
∂E
[
ui ◦ v
(
P
(1)
i
)]
∂γij
> 0
⇐⇒
∫ L∗j [1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
−∞
(ajrj + dj)w(rj) drj + L
∗
j [1 + rD(ωj)])
∫ +∞
L∗
j
[1+rD(ωj)]−dj
aj
w(rj) drj
> [1 + rD(ωi)]L(0)j
∫ +∞
−∞
w(rj) drj.
C.8 For Proposition 4
Proof. Recall that we consider the following dynamics for Axi, i = 1, 2:
log
(
Ax
(1)
i
Ax
(0)
i
)
∼ N (µi, σi) i.e. Ax(1)i = Ax(0)i eµi+σiU , where U ∼ N (0, 1).
We have K(1)i = max(κiAx
(1)
i − L∗(1)i , 0) and L(1)i = min(κiAx(1)i , L∗(1)i ).
We define u˜ such that κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+σiu˜ = L
∗(1)
i , i.e. u˜ =
1
σi
(
log
(
L
∗(1)
i
κiAx
(0)
i
)
− µi
)
. Let us
denote by φ the density of the standard Gaussian variable. We have
E0
(
K
(1)
i
)
= E0
[
max(κiAx
(1)
i − L∗(1)i , 0)
]
=
∫ +∞
u˜
(
κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+σiu − L∗(1)i
)
φ(u) du
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi
∫ +∞
u˜
eσiuφ(u) du− L∗(1)i
∫ +∞
u˜
φ(u) du
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi
∫ +∞
u˜
eσiu
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
u2 du− L∗(1)i [1− Φ(u˜)]
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi
∫ +∞
u˜
e
1
2
σ2i
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
(u−σi)2du− L∗(1)i [1− Φ(u˜)]
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+
1
2
σ2i
∫ +∞
u˜−σi
φ(v) dv − L∗(1)i [1− Φ(u˜)] (by the change of variable v = u− σi)
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+
1
2
σ2i [1− Φ(u˜− σi)]− L∗(1)i [1− Φ(u˜)] .
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In the same way,
E0
(
L
(1)
i
)
= E0
[
min(κiAx
(1)
i , L
∗(1)
i )
]
=
∫ u˜
−∞
κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+σiuφ(u) du+
∫ +∞
u˜
L
∗(1)
i φ(u) du
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+
1
2
σ2i
∫ u˜−σi
−∞
φ(v) dv + L
∗(1)
i [1− Φ(u˜)]
(using the same trick than in the case of K(1)i )
= κiAx
(0)
i e
µi+
1
2
σ2i Φ (u˜− σi) + L∗(1)i [1− Φ(u˜)] .
D Algorithm of network formation
In the case of 2 institutions (n = 2), the algorithm of network formation is the following:
1. Optimization for Bank 1 without interconnections. Indeed in this first step,
K
(0)
2 and L
(0)
2 are not known.
We then have to optimize E
{
u1
[
v
(
P
(1)
1 (Ax
(0)
1 , L
(0)
1 )
)]}
, where
P
(1)
1 = Ax
(0)
1 (1 + r1)− [1 + rD,1]L(0)1 .
This step provides Ax(0)1 and L
(0)
1 .
2. Optimization for Bank 2 with interconnections. We have
P
(1)
2 = Ax
(0)
2 (1 + r2) + pi2,1 max
(
κ1Ax
(0)
1 (1 + r1)− L(0)1 [1 + rD,1], 0
)
+ γ2,1 min
(
κ1Ax
(0)
1 (1 + r1), L
(0)
1 [1 + rD,1]
)
− [1 + rD,2]L(0)2 ,
where κ1 =
L
(0)
1 +K
(0)
1
Ax
(0)
1
is the scaling factor compensating the absence of inter-
connections (it keeps the balance sheet of Bank 1 balanced). Since K(0)1 has been
obtained at step 1 under the assumption that Bank 1 is not interconnected, here
κ1 = 1. But this will be corrected in further iterations.
This step gives Ax(0)2 , L
(0)
2 , pi2,1 and γ2,1.
3. Optimization for Bank 1 with interconnections. We have
P
(1)
1 = Ax
(0)
1 (1 + r1) + pi1,2 max
(
κ2Ax
(0)
2 (1 + r2)− L(0)2 [1 + rD,2], 0
)
+ γ1,2 min
(
κ2Ax
(0)
2 (1 + r2), L
(0)
2 [1 + rD,2)]
)
− [1 + rD,1]L(0)1
where κ2 =
L
(0)
2 +K
(0)
2
Ax
(0)
2
. This step provides Ax(0)1 , L
(0)
1 , pi1,2 and γ1,2.
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4. New optimization for Bank 2 with interconnections.
Note that at this step, κ1 =
L
(0)
1 +K
(0)
1
Ax
(0)
1
> 1, since at the previous step, the
optimization has be done for Bank 1 being interconnected.
5. New optimization for Bank 1 with interconnections.
Further iterations can be carried out if the variation in the estimates from one step to
the next is higher than a predefined threshold.
E Calibration of external assets returns
Given the values of the mean net returns and the probability of default, let us derive the
corresponding values of µi and σi, for i = 1, 2. We denote by GRi and NRi the gross
and the net return of Bank i, respectively. They satisfy the relationship NRi = GRi− 1.
Thus, since the gross returns are log-normal,
E(NRi) = E(GRi)− 1 = exp
(
µi +
σ2i
2
)
− 1.
If we denote by mi the empirical mean of the net return, we then have
mi = exp
(
µi +
σ2i
2
)
− 1,
that gives
µi = log(1 +mi)− σ
2
i
2
. (20)
We need a second equation to find µi and σi. We could use the expression
Var(NRi) = Var(GRi) = (exp(σ2i )− 1) exp(2µi + σ2i )
i.e., by denoting vi the empirical variance of RNi,
vi = (exp(σ
2
i )− 1) exp(2µi + σ2i ).
However, it is difficult to find reliable values for vi. If we consider banks’ data, only
one return is available per year and thus the estimation of the variance is inaccurate.
Another possibility is to compute the variance of the net returns of an index like the
CAC 40. However, such an index is not representative of the external assets of a financial
institution since it only contains shares. Moreover, it does not take the hedging strategy
of the institution into account.
Therefore, we choose to derive the needed equation from the probability of default.
This quantity is indeed easier to obtain. Actually, the usual rating for large banks cor-
responds to a probability of default of about 0.1%. Considering an autarkic stylized
bank with debt Li and a total asset Ai, whose gross returns are log-normal of parameter
(µi, σi), the probability of default is
PD = Φ
 log
(
Li
Ai
)
− µi
σi
 . (21)
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Using in (21) the expression of µi in (20), we obtain
PD = Φ
 log
(
Li
Ai
)
− log(1 +mi) + σ
2
i
2
σi
 = Φ
 log
(
Li
Ai(1 +mi)
)
+
σ2i
2
σi
 .
If we denote by p the empirical probability of default, the equation to solve is
p = Φ
 log
(
Li
Ai(1 +mi)
)
+
σ2i
2
σi
⇐⇒ σ2i2 − σi Φ−1(p) + log
(
Li
Ai(1 +mi)
)
= 0.
This is a quadratic equation with discriminant ∆ = [Φ−1(p)]2−2 log
(
Li
Ai(1 +mi)
)
. With
chosen values of Ai, Li and mi, we know that ∆ > 0 and thus σi = Φ−1(p) +
√
∆, since
the other solution is strictly negative and thus unsuitable for a volatility. Finally the
implied volatility is written
σi = Φ
−1(p) +
√
[Φ−1(p)]2 − 2 log
(
Li
Ai(1 +mi)
)
. (22)
We then obtain µi using (20).
F Algorithm of equilibrium computation
The computation of the equilibrium involving n financial institutions requires to solve
up to 2n linear systems with a brutal force approach (see Gouriéroux et al. (2012) for
details), implying a total complexity in O(n3 × 2n). The cubic term stems from the
resolution of a linear system that requires to invert a n × n matrix. Only a little gain
can be obtained on this term. The exponential term comes from testing each possible
situation: each institution is either solvent or in default.
Instead, in order to deal with the exponential term, we adopt an heuristic algorithm.
The key idea is to test the 2n potential regimes in a "proper" order and to use the
existence and uniqueness property to stop the algorithm as soon as one feasible solution
is computed. Since interconnections are small, the way of sorting the regimes relies on
the situation without interconnections.
To do so, let us define Regime r by dr = (dr1, . . . , drn)′, where dri = −1 if Institution i is
in default and 1 otherwise (for i = 1, . . . , n). We define a weight vector w = (w1, . . . , wn),
where wi = (Axi +A`i−L∗i )/L∗i (for i = 1, . . . , n). Note that w depends on some known
inputs only and can therefore be easily computed. When wi is positive, the external
assets of financial institution i are higher than its nominal debt. Therefore, whatever the
situations of other financial institutions, Institution i is always solvent at the equilibrium.
On the contrary, when wi is negative, the financial institution needs a sufficient amount
of inter-financial assets to be solvent. In that case, since interconnections are assumed
to be small, the (absolute) value of wi indicates the likelihood (in a non-statistical sense)
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of default of Institution i. One can associate to Regime r a score, given by w.dr, which
measures the likelihood of Regime r. For instance, if w contains many negative values,
we might think that the equilibrium lies in a regime with a lot of institutions in default.
Thus, a regime with many values of dri equal to −1 will be likely and will be associated
to a high score.
Actually, the regime with the highest score can easily be derived from w. This regime,
labeled r, is defined by dri = I{wi>0} − I{wi≤0}, for i = 1, . . . , n. If wi ≤ 0, it is likely that
Institution i is in default and thus we set dri = −1. The contrary is true when wi > 0.
We test this most likely regime. If it corresponds to the solution, we have finished. If
not, one can switch the components of dr one by one to get new regimes with high scores.
It is important to keep in mind that assuming the default of an institution with positive
weight is dead-end. While no solution was found, this mechanism of building new regimes
can be carried on until having sorted all the potential regimes apart from the ones for
which there exists i such that wi > 0 and di = −1.
The complexity (in the worst case) of this algorithm is in O(n3 × 2n−p), where
p = #{i : wi > 0}, with # standing for the cardinal. Thus, we still have an expo-
nential term. However, the expectation of the number of regimes to be tested before
finding the solution is much lower than in the case of the brutal force approach. The
algorithm performs well in practice. For example, with 10 financial institutions having
log-normal returns and random interconnections, the equilibrium lies in the 10 first tested
regimes in almost all cases.
NB: If one remains concerned by exploring all the regimes (implying keeping the
exponential term in the complexity), one solution is to stop the search after an arbitrary
number of regimes (for instance n). When the exploration approach is stopped, a pure
numerical approach can be carried out, in order to solve the system (K,L)′ = q[(K,L)′ ],
where the function q is defined using Equations 1 and 2. For instance, routines to minimize
or to find the zeros of k[(K,L)′ ] = q[(K,L)′ ]− (K,L)′ can be used.
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